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1 
COWORKER RETALIATION IN THE #METOO ERA 
Deborah L. Brake* 
I. INTRODUCTION: #METOO, RETALIATION, AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF COWORKER REACTIONS
For over a year now, the #MeToo movement has spread like 
wildfire, galvanizing feminist legal scholars to reconsider how law 
should respond to sexual harassment in the workplace and to assess 
the potential for #MeToo to change workplace culture.1  In the 
feminist legal scholarship considering #MeToo to date, less attention 
has been paid to how the movement and its fallout intersect with 
retaliation law than to the movement’s incongruity with the 
substantive law of sexual harassment.2  Given that the fear of 
retaliation is a primary reason for not confronting sexual harassment,3 
retaliation law necessarily plays an outsized role in shaping responses 
to sexual harassment.4  This Article focuses on retaliation as a key 
site of inquiry in exploring the transformative potential of #MeToo.5 
Although the growing strength of #MeToo suggests that social 
norms tolerating sexual harassment may be changing, the likelihood 
of negative reactions to sexual harassment disclosures remains high.6  
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, John E. Murray Faculty
Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. See Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 45, 47–48 (explaining that #MeToo caused a “cultural reckoning” and inspired
efforts to “amplify and credit survivors’ voices, seek accountability, change
workplace practices, and encourage access to the legal system”).
2. One notable exception is Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting
with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018) (arguing that prevention of
retaliation should be the starting point for ending sexual harassment).
3. Id. (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF
THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 16
(2016) [hereinafter EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT], https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_for
ce/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAY2-WZG8]).
4. See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (documenting fear of retaliation
as a primary force suppressing reporting of sexual harassment).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See Stefanie K. Johnson et al., Has Sexual Harassment at Work Decreased Since
#MeToo?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 18, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/07/has-sexual-
harassment-at-work-decreased-since-metoo [https://perma.cc/EHG2-C7HY]
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The psychological and social forces that make retaliation likely 
predate #MeToo.7  The prevalence of retaliation reflects a common 
tendency to blame persons who identify themselves as victims of 
discrimination, a tendency that is enhanced by the belief in a just and 
meritocratic society.8  One troubling finding in the social psychology 
literature on this phenomenon is that the inclination to blame persons 
who attribute negative outcomes to discrimination is not abated by 
reliable evidence that discrimination, in fact, occurred.9  People 
ascribe negative qualities to individuals who attribute their failures to 
discrimination as opposed to some other hurdle, even when it is 
evident that discrimination occurred.10  To the extent that #MeToo 
has bolstered the credibility of women complaining about sexual 
harassment, that shift is not likely to reduce retaliatory responses.11  
Indeed, as the #MeToo movement expands to push the boundaries of 
conventional understandings of sexual harms, retaliatory responses 
may become even more likely.12  As socio-legal scholars have 
shown, reforms that deviate too far from prevailing understandings of 
what constitutes “discrimination” tend to provoke a backlash.13 
Evidence suggests that backlash to #MeToo is already ascendant.14  
A recent poll conducted by National Public Radio found that more 
than 40% of people surveyed agreed with the statement that #MeToo 
has gone too far.15  One indicator of a growing backlash can be found 
in the public response to the Senate hearings on the nomination of 
(reporting that negative backlash towards women in the workplace has increased since 
the #MeToo movement). 
7. See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (explaining, a year before the
#MeToo movement, the prevalence of social and professional retaliation).
8. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of
Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1309 (2012).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. (concluding that strong evidence of discrimination will not prevent negative
reactions towards victims); see also Johnson et al., supra note 6 (finding that negative
reactions towards women in the workplace have increased since #MeToo).
12. The controversy over the alleged encounter with Aziz Ansari is a case in point.  See
Katie Way, I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari. It Turned into the Worst Night of My
Life, BABE (Jan. 13, 2018), https://babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-28355
[https://perma.cc/XMC2-PRLM].
13. See Eyer, supra note 8, at 1332.
14. See infra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
15. Tovia Smith, On #MeToo, Americans More Divided by Party than Gender, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 31, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/31/662178315/
on-metoo-americans-more-divided-by-party-than-gender [https://perma.cc/SZ6C-
NZST] (reporting results of National Public Radio poll finding that more than 40% of
Americans surveyed said the movement had gone too far).
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Brett Kavanaugh to the United States Supreme Court.16  While 
reactions were highly polarized, they included pronounced hostility 
toward sexual assault accusers writ large.17  #DefendOurMen became 
a mantra of some Kavanaugh supporters, who framed men as the 
victims of the #MeToo movement on a rampage to derail the careers 
of successful men with bright futures.18 
As disclosures of sexual harassment continue to flood social 
media,19 opportunities for negative reactions at work remain 
abundant.20  It remains to be seen whether Title VII retaliation law is 
up to the task.21  One commentator argued that despite a series of 
pro-plaintiff retaliation decisions by the Supreme Court in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, more recent developments portend 
a judicial backlash in retaliation law in the lower courts.22 
In highlighting the importance of retaliation law for the future of 
#MeToo, I do not intend to suggest that the retaliation claim has the 
potential to capture all, or even most, negative reactions to #MeToo 
disclosures at work.  The limited scope of retaliation law necessarily 
leaves many #MeToo moments outside the law’s protection.23 
Perhaps the most significant limitation is that a complaint of sexual 
harassment by someone who is not connected to the workplace is not 
protected activity under Title VII.24  Many of the high-profile 
16. See Eugene Scott, Amid Allegations Against Kavanaugh, Worry About the Future of
Boys and Men, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/politics/2018/10/02/amid-allegations-against-kavanaugh-worry-about-future-boys-
men/ [https://perma.cc/S2X2-WCZ4].
17. See generally id. (reporting that reactions to Kavanaugh’s nomination were split along
political and gender lines, and that conservative men called for pushback against
accusers’ claims).
18. See id.
19. #MeToo Floods Social Media with Stories of Sexual Harassment and Abuse, CBS 
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017, 11:57 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/me-too-campaign-
floods-social-media-sexual-harassment-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/TF98-SLDF].
20. See Alex Press, Women Are Filing More Harassment Claims in the #MeToo Era.
They’re Also Facing More Retaliation, VOX (May 9, 2019, 3:50 PM),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2019/5/9/18541982/sexual-harassment-me-too-
eeoc-complaints [https://perma.cc/PXH7-5DCX].
21. Cf. Alex B. Long, Retaliation Backlash, 93 WASH. L. REV. 715, 717–18 (2018)
(discussing whether Title VII retaliation law is effective at protecting workplace
retaliation).
22. See id. at 715, 717, 723–24, 726–27.
23. Cf. id. at 717–19 (discussing how the courts narrowly interpret Title VII retaliation
law).
24. See Joshua Colangelo-Bryan, “Title VII Retaliation Claims: What Constitutes
Protected Activity?,” New York Law Journal, DORSEY (Mar. 9, 2004),
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#MeToo disclosures were from women who were not employed at 
the site where they were sexually harassed, or were not sexually 
harassed by a person working for their employer.25  For example, the 
Harvey Weinstein allegations that sparked outrage came from women 
who were not employed by the Weinstein Corporation at the time.26 
Similarly, many #MeToo reports about workplace harassment came 
from women who had long since left the place of employment where 
the abuse occurred.27  This is not surprising because fear of 
retaliation prevents many women from speaking up about sexual 
harassment and other forms of discrimination, while they are still 
employed.28 
Of course, Title VII’s limited scope in covering only the 
employment setting in which the harassment occurred is not unique 
to the #MeToo setting.29  Protection from retaliation has never 
extended to blacklisting by future employers.30  The plaintiff in the 
Supreme Court’s first sexual harassment case, Mechelle Vinson, 
experienced this first-hand when she was unable to find employment 
https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/2004/03/title-vii-retaliation-
claims-what-constitutes-pr__ [https://perma.cc/U6RA-4747]. 
25. See Alex Johnson, Judge Again Throws Out Ashley Judd’s Sexual Harassment Claim
Against Harvey Weinstein, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019, 9:53 PM), https://www.nbcnews
.com/storyline/harvey-weinstein-scandal/judge-again-throws-out-ashley-judd-s-
sexual-harassment-claim-n957011 [https://perma.cc/B7GE-4JPE]; see also Ashley
Louszko et al., Rose McGowan Describes Alleged Rape by Harvey Weinstein, Her
Thoughts on the Hollywood ‘System’, ABC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2018, 3:20 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/rose-mcgowan-describes-alleged-rape-harvey-
weinstein-thoughts/story?id=52684109 [https://perma.cc/X5RV-EMTK].
26. See sources cited supra note 25.
27. See Suzy Strutner, How to Report Sexual Harassment at a Previous Job, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 2, 2017, 9:07 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-to-report-sexual-
harassment-at-old-job_n_5a2190ade4b03c44072d5077 [https://perma.cc/VDX2-
B2YL].
28. See Maya Raghu, We Can’t Stop Sexual Harassment Without Addressing Retaliation,
NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://nwlc.org/blog/we-cant-stop-sexual-
harassment-without-addressing-retaliation/ [https://perma.cc/35TW-LM5L].
29. See Bryce Covert, Actresses–and Millions of Other Workers–Have No Federal Sexual
Harassment Protections, NATION (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/
article/actresses-and-millions-of-other-workers-have-no-federal-sexual-harassment-
protections/ [https://perma.cc/J3FQ-TJT9]; cf. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 63, 66 (1986) (holding that Title VII applies to sexual harassment by
employers against employees).
30. Cf. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, “What Not to Wear”—Race and Unwelcomeness in
Sexual Harassment Law: The Story of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in WOMEN 
AND THE LAW STORIES 277, 292–93 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M.
Wildman eds., 2011) (discussing the story of Mechelle Vinson, who was “blacklisted
in the banking industry” after she filed a sexual harassment suit against her employer).
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in the banking industry after suing her employer, Meritor Savings 
Bank, for sexual harassment.31  Although hardly a new problem, Title 
VII’s limited reach may have broader repercussions as the path 
widens, through newer forms of mass communication, for calling out 
sexual harassment that is not tied to the accuser’s current place of 
employment.32 
But the importance of retaliation law in connection with the 
#MeToo movement transcends the law’s scope of protection for the 
new strain of #MeToo disclosures.33  #MeToo has sparked a cultural 
reckoning with sexual harassment that promises to spur more 
outspoken opposition to sexual harassment in the workplace;34 and 
the beginnings of a #MeToo backlash signal that many of these 
challenges to sexual harassment at work will prompt retaliation in 
response.35  Title VII’s capacity to respond commensurately is of 
paramount importance to the strength of #MeToo and the 
movement’s potential to spark increased opposition to sexual 
harassment at work.36   
Of equal importance to protecting complainants is the expressive 
force of retaliation law in messaging and norm-setting about 
appropriate, non-retaliatory responses to sexual harassment 
complaints.37  The fallout from #MeToo requires the law to grapple 
anew with questions about what kinds of reactions are retaliatory and 
what obligations employers have to encourage a non-retaliatory tone 
and to police negative reactions.38  As Title VII law contends with 
these questions, employers will respond with their understanding of 
the law, sending signals about proper boundaries and incorporating 
their understandings into their workplace policies and training 
materials.39 
One notable attribute of the #MeToo movement is that it has 
proceeded as an extra-legal channel for addressing sexual harms and 
seeking accountability.40  Indeed, the movement stands as a scathing 
31. See id. at 293.
32. See supra notes 19–31 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 455–63, 466–68 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 512–14 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 486–500 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 492–501, 505–06, 508, 513–14 and accompanying text.
40. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came From, and Where It’s Going,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/
6 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
critique of law, its very strength serving as a stark indicator of the 
failure of law to eradicate sexual harassment.41  The movement’s 
echoes amplify critiques from within legal discourse, such as Tristin 
Green’s recent missive, asking “Was Sexual Harassment Law a 
Mistake?”42  Green faults legal doctrine for distorting and diluting the 
stories that women tell of sexual harassment,43 as in the foundational 
case against Meritor Savings Bank in which Mechelle Vinson was 
forced to articulate her case as the story of one victim of one sexual 
harasser.44  The institutional hierarchy that marginalized women in 
lower status positions, and enabled men such as the Vice President of 
the bank to pervasively abuse power, was obscured.45  The court did 
not permit Mechelle Vinson to bring in the stories of other women 
harassed by the bank Vice President, Sidney Taylor, making her own 
story resemble a romance-gone-wrong, and eclipsing some of the 
more pernicious and institutionally ingrained elements of the abuse.46  
It is easier to discount women’s stories when they appear 
aberrational47—and all the more so for women of color.48  In the 
wake of sexual harassment law’s failures,49 #MeToo intervenes as 
both a corrective and a critique; its power residing in the collective, 
the “me too.”50 
Precisely because of its extra-legal position, #MeToo is more 
dependent on the law of retaliation than the scope of sexual 
harassment law for its continued strength.51  Protecting the space for 
sharing stories and initiating conversations about sexual harassment 
may be more important than expanding the reach of what counts as 
actionable sexual harassment at work.52  Ensuring this protection is 
of the utmost importance because the movement’s power has been 
catharine-mackinnon-what-metoo-has-changed/585313/ [https://perma.cc/RVG9-
WCVG].  
41. See infra notes 42–50 and accompanying text.
42. See Tristan K. Green, Was Sexual Harassment Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell,
128 YALE L.J. FORUM 152, 153–54 (June 18, 2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/was-sexual-harassment-law-mistake [https://perma.cc/RVG9-WCVG].
43. See id. at 153.
44. See id. at 160–61.
45. See id. at 154–55.
46. See id. at 160.
47. See id. at 154.
48. See Alicia Sanchez Gill et al., Women and Girls of Color Need Justice Too, REWIRE 
NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019, 11:16 AM), https://rewire.news/article/2019/01/14/women-and-
girls-of-color-need-justice-too/ [https://perma.cc/VMN7-6E8J].
49. See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
50. See MacKinnon, supra note 40.
51. See infra notes 52–79 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 53–79 and accompanying text.
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acquired through the telling of people’s stories and in the collective 
opposition to sexual harassment it engenders, as the mover of 
norms.53 
One type of retaliation in particular, coworker retaliation, has 
escaped the attention of #MeToo scholarship.54  Already 
underdeveloped as a species of retaliation law, coworker retaliation 
has important implications for #MeToo for several reasons.55  First, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Vance v. Ball State University56 
means that many employees with day-to-day supervisory 
responsibilities over other workers will be treated as coworkers and 
not as supervisors for the purposes of employer liability for 
retaliatory harassment.57  Although Vance’s holding addressed 
employer liability for sexual harassment, its reasoning fully extends 
to retaliatory harassment as well.58  After Vance, more retaliatory 
conduct that Title VII otherwise might have captured as retaliation by 
a supervisor will now fall under the murkier legal standards 
applicable to coworker retaliation.59 
A second reason for focusing on coworker retaliation in relation to 
#MeToo is that coworker reactions are an important yet often 
overlooked influence on both the targets of sexual harassment and the 
harassers.60  Having the support of coworkers greatly increases the 
likelihood that a victim will report incidents of harassment.61 
Conversely, a lack of coworker support can make employees more 
53. See MacKinnon, supra note 40.
54. See infra Part II.
55. See infra notes 56–79 and accompanying text.
56. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013) (holding “that an employee is a
‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is
empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim”).
57. See id. at 431.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See infra notes 61–79 and accompanying text.
61. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605, 609,
621–24 (2017) (discussing the importance of coworker support for employee
willingness to report misconduct and harassment in the workplace); see also Shankar
Vedantam, Why Now?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 27, 2018, 6:16 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=633199277
[https://perma.cc/T4BV-2NRS] (interviewing political scientist Timur Kuran about
the phenomenon of “preference falsification”—the belief that your experience runs
counter to public opinion—and psychology professor Betsy Paluck on “social
proof”—looking at reactions to persons who have spoken as precedent for what would
happen if you did—in exploring the question of why women do and do not speak up
about sexual harassment and abuse).
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vulnerable to harassment and more likely to be harassed.62  For the 
potential harasser, the perception that they have coworker support for 
their conduct is a significant factor in their likelihood of engaging in 
sexual assault and harassment.63  When coworkers support the 
harasser and react negatively to sexual harassment disclosures, it 
contributes to a workplace culture that normalizes harassment and 
chills reporting.64 
Coworker retaliation also has pronounced harms on the persons 
targeted.65  Although retaliation law prioritizes retaliation by 
supervisors,66 coworkers can be an equally powerful force in 
establishing cultures of silence and discrimination.67  A recent article 
by Catherine Albiston and Tristin Green uses the term “social closure 
discrimination,” drawing on Max Weber’s theory of social closure,68 
to explain the discriminatory harms that result when people draw 
boundaries and construct identities to bolster their ingroup, and then 
accumulate resources and status by excluding others.69  Albiston and 
Green critique the substantive law of employment discrimination for 
its failure to capture the phenomenon of social closure at work.70  A 
similar phenomenon results when people side with harassers over 
complainants and close ranks around the accused.71  Retaliation, as 
much as discrimination, can reinforce ingroup identities, and 
coworkers, no less than supervisors, can enforce social closure.72  
Even without formally delegated power, coworkers can close ranks 
and exclude others from key informal networks, which are integral to 
62. See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 625.
63. Cf. Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for
Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 69–78 (2002) (discussing the importance of
coworkers in preventing or encouraging harassment and discrimination).
64. See id. at 69–75 (explaining the consequences of coworkers supporting a harasser in
the workplace).
65. See infra notes 66–75 and accompanying text.
66. See Long, supra note 21, at 719–23.
67. See Zatz, supra note 63, at 69–75.
68. Catharine Albiston & Tristin K. Green, Social Closure Discrimination, 39 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 2, 12 (2018).
69. See id. at 4–22.
70. See id. at 23–34.
71. See Zatz, supra note 63, at 69–75; see Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It
to Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/68LF-3BBK] (describing women’s allegations that
they were “mocked, dismissed, threatened and ostracized” for complaining, called a
“snitch bitch,” and accused of “raping the company”).
72. See Zatz, supra note 63, at 69–75; see Chira & Einhorn, supra note 71.
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job success.73  A New York Times magazine article on the saga of 
sexual harassment at a Ford motor plant in Chicago offers a poignant 
illustration of how retaliation and sexual harassment intertwine to 
create social closure, largely by coworkers.74  Women who worked at 
the plant, many of whom were women of color, suffered protracted 
and escalating harassment that was both sexually (and often racially) 
explicit and retaliatory, enforcing a culture of silence and submission 
for those who stayed.75 
The use of social media to spread #MeToo disclosures makes 
coworker reactions all the more likely to affect workplace culture.76  
Coworkers may be especially likely to see and react to social media 
disclosures, sometimes supportively, sometimes negatively, because 
of the sprawling connections on Facebook, Twitter, and other 
platforms that draw acquaintances from work into each other’s social 
media orbits.77  What may begin as venting on social media can cross 
over into traditional channels of opposition to sexual harassment at 
work.78  The connectedness of colleagues through social media 
creates an integrated web of knowledge and social norms that can 
easily spill over into the workplace.79 
For all of these reasons, #MeToo is on a collision course with the 
nascent law of coworker retaliation.80  Despite its significance to 
workplace culture, coworker retaliation has long been the poor 
stepchild of Title VII retaliation law.81  The doctrine on coworker 
retaliation is less developed and rarely the subject of study.82  This 
Article takes a closer look at coworker retaliation and considers how 
emerging lessons from #MeToo might be productively brought to 
73. See Albiston & Green, supra note 68, at 9.
74. See Chira & Einhorn, supra note 71.
75. See id.
76. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Lisa A. Mainiero & Kevin J. Jones, Workplace Romance 2.0:
Developing a Communication Ethics Model to Address Potential Sexual Harassment
from Inappropriate Social Media Contacts Between Coworkers, 114 J. BUS. ETHICS
367, 368 (2013) (“The use of new social media technologies such as Facebook,
LinkedIn, and Twitter . . . have created situations where some employees complain
another employee may have created a hostile environment for them outside the office
which then impacts their behavior inside the office.”); see generally Christopher E.
Parker, Rising Tide of Social Media, 58 FED. LAW. 14, 14 (2011) (explaining the vast
number of individuals who communicate on social media platforms).
78. See Mainiero & Jones, supra note 77, at 368.
79. See id.
80. See supra notes 54–79 and accompanying text.
81. See infra Part II.
82. See infra Part II.
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bear on the development of Title VII law as applied to coworker 
retaliation for opposition to sexual harassment.83  Because of the role 
coworker reactions play in individual decisions about whether to 
speak up about personal experience with sexual harassment,84 
retaliation law’s response to coworker retaliation has an integral 
relation to the #MeToo movement.85  This Article explores several 
fault lines in the doctrine governing employer responsibility for 
coworker retaliation that may affect—and potentially hinder—the 
transformative impact of #MeToo in the workplace.86 
II. UNCERTAINTIES AND GAPS IN TITLE VII’S COVERAGE
OF COWORKER RETALIATION
Title VII has long been in need of an overhaul of its framework for 
addressing coworker retaliation.87  While other aspects of retaliation 
have given rise to sustained attention and Supreme Court decisions, 
the law governing coworker retaliation remains underdeveloped.88  
Even without #MeToo, the Vance decision, which narrows the 
category of “supervisor” and leaves more retaliatory actions in the 
realm of coworker retaliation, harkens a shift in the paradigmatic 
retaliation case.89  #MeToo makes lingering questions about the law’s 
treatment of coworker retaliation all the more pressing.  This Article 
takes a closer look at three doctrines that pose difficulties for Title 
VII’s applicability to coworker retaliation: the standard of employer 
liability;90 the extent of severity required to reasonably chill a 
complainant;91 and the parsing of retaliatory causation from sex-
based motivation.92  This section considers each issue in turn.93 
83. See infra Parts II–III.
84. See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 621–22.
85. See infra Part III.
86. See infra Part II.
87. See Donna Lenhoff, The #MeToo Movement Will Be in Vain if We Don’t Make These
Changes, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the
-metoo-movement-will-be-in-vain-if-we-dont-make-these-changes/2018/01/25/5add9
5a8-0090-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story_html [https://perma.cc/FVT3-MGPS].
88. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless LP, 562 U.S. 170, 172 (2011); see Crawford v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009); see CBOCS W. v. Humphries,
553 U.S. 442, 452 (2008); see Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 490 (2008); see
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 70 (2006).
89. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 450 (2013).
90. See discussion infra Section II.A.
91. See discussion infra Section II.B.
92. See discussion infra Section II.C.
93. See discussion infra Sections II.A–C.
2019] Coworker Retaliation 11 
A. Employer Liability for Coworker Retaliation
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s attention to retaliation cases
in recent years,94 employer responsibility for retaliatory actions by 
coworkers remains a muddle.95  Clarity about employer liability for 
coworker retaliation is important not only for litigating individual 
cases, but also for incentivizing employers to prevent retaliatory 
actions and promote workplace cultures that enable employees to 
oppose discrimination.96  Without guidance from the Supreme Court, 
lower courts have varied greatly in how they apply Title VII to 
retaliation by coworkers.97 
Among the more skeptical courts, the Fifth Circuit stands out.98  It 
has long resisted an interpretation of Title VII that would protect 
complainants from retaliation by coworkers.99  In order for coworker 
retaliation to give rise to an actionable claim, the Fifth Circuit 
requires a plaintiff to prove that the coworker’s actions were 
undertaken “in furtherance of the employer’s business.”100  To meet 
this standard, there must be a “direct relationship” between the 
retaliatory acts by coworkers and the employer’s business 
interests.101  Coworker retaliation must serve the employer’s business 
in order for the employer to be responsible for taking corrective 
action.102 
Both the standard itself and the way courts apply it are troubling in 
the #MeToo era of escalating reports of sexual harassment.103  The 
Fifth Circuit’s standard posits a sharp distinction between retaliation 
that does and does not serve the employer’s business interests.104  
The difficulty is not just that there is no bright line between these two 
poles, but that there is no line whatsoever.105  Any action that 
discourages employees from complaining about sexual harassment 
can be said to serve the interest of the employer in maintaining a 
94. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation
Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 923 (2009).
95. See infra notes 100–36, 153–242 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 285–90 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 100–36, 153–242 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 99–151 and accompanying text.
99. See Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012).
100. Id. (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996).
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See infra notes 104–13 and accompanying text.
104. See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657.
105. See id.
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placid workforce that tolerates whatever sexual misconduct is 
encountered.106  The employer strategy of “divide and conquer” is a 
tried and true tactic of employers seeking to remain unconstrained by 
unions and other collective action demands.107  At least in the short 
run, chilling complaints may serve the employer’s business interests 
by enforcing loyalty to the organization rather than to an employee’s 
contrary expectations or ideals about what employees should have to 
tolerate.108  When troublemakers are silenced, the employer can 
proceed with business as usual.109  The Fifth Circuit rule 
misunderstands how retaliatory workplace dynamics of divisiveness 
may, at least in the short term, serve profit-making goals, and that 
employers may benefit from inter-group dissension and conflict 
among workers.110 
As courts have applied the Fifth Circuit’s rule, it is not enough for 
plaintiffs to argue that retaliation serves the employer’s interest in 
maintaining a placid and divided workforce.111  Something more is 
required, and it is not clear what connections between the retaliatory 
acts and the employer’s business interests could possibly suffice.112  
The Fifth Circuit’s liability standard appears to import a principle of 
agency law approximating scope of employment.113  Adopting scope 
of employment for coworker retaliation, however, sets an 
insurmountable hurdle.114  Under the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
the scope of employment doctrine in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth,115 scope of employment is a narrow construct, excluding 
even supervisors’ sexual harassment as the equivalent of a frolic and 
detour.116  Claims for coworker retaliation would fare no better under 
106. See id.
107. See Eric A. Posner et al., Divide and Conquer, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 417, 438–40
(2010).
108. See Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A
Barrier to Change and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
706, 719 (2000).
109. See id. at 716–17.
110. See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657.
111. See Green v. Trimac Transp. S., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-444, 2012 WL 12893293, at *16–
17 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2012); see Sapp v. Potter, No. 1:07-CV-00650, 2012 WL
3890259, at *10–11 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2012), aff’d Sapp v. Donohoe, 539 F. App'x
590 (5th Cir. 2013).
112. See Green, 2012 WL 12893293, at *16–17; see Sapp, 2012 WL 3890259, at *10–11.
113. See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657.
114. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756–57 (1998).
115. See id.
116. See id.
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this understanding of the scope of employment.117  As long as the 
retaliating coworker is not acting in an agency capacity for the 
employer, it is difficult to fathom how a plaintiff could show that the 
retaliation directly furthers the employer’s business in this sense.118 
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Vance v. Ball State 
University makes threading the Fifth Circuit’s needle all the more 
difficult.119  In Vance, the Court restricted the definition of a 
supervisor for the purposes of applying the employer liability 
framework adopted in Ellerth for sexual harassment by a 
supervisor.120  Only persons with authority to take a tangible 
employment action against the plaintiff qualify as supervisors;121 it is 
not enough to have day-to-day control over the plaintiff’s work 
assignments and job conditions.122  Although Vance considered this 
question in the context of employer liability for racial harassment,123 
the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the question of who 
qualifies as a supervisor for purposes of retaliation law.124 
In the Fifth Circuit, the combination of Vance and the “must serve 
the employer’s business” rule is deadly for plaintiffs bringing claims 
for coworker retaliation.125  By narrowing the category of 
“supervisor” in a retaliation case, the employer liability standard for 
coworker harassment will apply to a broad swath of retaliatory 
conduct.126  Not only does Vance mean that the legal standards 
governing coworker retaliation will govern a larger class of cases, it 
also interacts with the Fifth Circuit’s liability standard for coworker 
retaliation in troubling ways, further winnowing the chances for 
meeting the further-the-employer’s business standard.127 
117. See Elizabeth A. Cramer, Taking Matters into Their Own Hands: Retaliatory Actions
by Coworkers and the Fifth Circuit’s Narrow Standard for Employer Liability, 82 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 591, 600–01 (2014).
118. See id. at 601.
119. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431–32 (2013).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 449–50.
123. See id. at 425.
124. See Elizabeth Lee, Simplicity v. Reality in the Workplace: Balancing the Aims of
Vance v. Ball State University and the Fair Employment Protection Act, 67 HASTINGS
L.J. 1769, 1773–74, 1786 (2016).
125. See infra notes 126–36 and accompanying text.
126. See Vance, 570 U.S. at 453–54, 466–68 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012); see also
Lakisha A. Davis, Who’s the Boss? A Distinction Without a Difference, 19 BARRY L.
REV. 155, 167 (2013) (considering when the harasser is not a supervisor, “then an
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One post-Vance decision by the Fifth Circuit, Spencer v. Schmidt 
Electric Co., traces the narrow path left for challenging retaliation by 
coworkers.128  The plaintiff, an apprentice on a job site, was racially 
harassed by two foremen who oversaw his work.129  In addition to 
making repeated racist comments, the foremen texted the plaintiff a 
picture of a white Santa Clause wearing a white hood, holding a 
noose, and standing in front of a burning cross.130  After the plaintiff 
complained to his union steward, the foremen cornered him in a 
room, blocked him from leaving and intimidated him, and asked him 
whom else he had told about the offending text message.131  The 
appellate court did not address whether the incident met the standard 
of severity required for actionable retaliation (the district court held it 
did not) because even if it did, the employer was not liable for the 
foremen’s actions because they did not act as agents of the 
employer.132  Although the foremen had day-to-day supervisory 
control over the plaintiff and could recommend his dismissal, they 
did not have the ultimate authority to take tangible employment 
actions and so they were not considered “supervisors” under 
Vance.133  Because the foremen lacked the power to hire or fire the 
plaintiff, the court reasoned their conduct was not in furtherance of 
the employer’s interest.134  The court did not address whether the 
employer might be held responsible under some other fault-based 
standard, but the court’s reasoning appeared to foreclose that 
result.135  As the court explained the law, a plaintiff “must establish 
that the employer was effectively the intimidator, and ‘that the desire 
to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment 
action.’”136 
employee’s only recourse is to prove the employer’s liability under the negligence 
standard”). 
128. See Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App’x. 442, 447–50 (5th Cir. 2014).
129. Id. at 444.
130. Id.  The plaintiff also saw nooses left around the work site, was mocked about the
quality of his work, and was required to repeat tasks for no apparent reason.  Id.
131. Id. at 444, 449.
132. See id. at 448–50.
133. See id. at 447–48.
134. See id. at 449–50.
135. See id. at 450.
136. Id. at 449 (emphasis added) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
338, 352 (2013)).  One judge dissented in regard to the retaliation claim on the
grounds that the majority was too quick to say that the foremen were not supervisors
as a matter of law because the issue appeared to be a question of fact.  See id. at 452–
53, 455 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The combination of applying Vance’s definition of a supervisor to 
retaliation law,137 and then limiting the class of persons whose 
retaliatory acts may occur within the scope of employment to 
supervisors,138 creates a de facto bar to employer liability for 
retaliatory acts by coworkers.139  “[A]ny alleged retaliation must be 
by the employer,”140 the court proclaimed in Spencer, explaining that 
employers are only liable “in accordance with common law agency 
principles, for the acts of employees committed in furtherance of the 
employer’s business.”141  With “agent” defined narrowly to conform 
to the definition of a supervisor empowered to take tangible 
employment action,142 the court’s reasoning shows how Vance, 
combined with the requirement that the retaliator act in furtherance of 
the employer’s business, sets an insurmountable hurdle to 
establishing employer liability for coworker retaliation.143 
A recent decision from a district court in the Fifth Circuit put it 
even more starkly: “The actions of ordinary employees are not 
imputable to” the employer.144  Instead, there must be “a direct 
relationship” between the retaliatory act and the employer’s 
business.145  Predictably, the retaliation claim failed in that case 
because the plaintiff could not show that the coworker retaliation 
occurred in furtherance of the employer’s business, because the 
coworker did not act as an agent of the employer.146  The circularity 
of the rule did not deter the court from applying it.147 
The Fifth Circuit’s liability standard reflects a narrow, formalistic 
understanding of organizational power, holding employers 
accountable only for abuses of power by persons with the delegated 
authority to take tangible employment actions, such as hiring and 
137. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431–32 (2013).
138. See Spencer, 576 F. App’x. at 447–50.
139. See supra notes 113–24 and accompanying text.
140. Spencer, 576 F. App’x at 449.
141. Id. (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)).
142. See id. at 448–50.
143. See supra notes 133–42 and accompanying text.
144. Beard v. Yamane, No. 3:14-CV-2828, 2015 WL 1525076, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2,
2015) (plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed where plaintiff did not allege that the
retaliating coworkers “were anything other than ordinary employees or that their
alleged retaliatory harassment was committed in furtherance of [defendant’s]
business”).
145. Id. (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996)).
146. See id.
147. See id.
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firing.148  Other abuses of power are viewed as separate from the 
employer’s interests.149  This approach rejects any potentially broader 
fault-based liability standards, leaving vicarious liability as the only 
possible path to employer liability.150  This approach recognizes 
formal delegations of tangible employment actions as the only form 
of power that matters for employer accountability and neglects the 
importance of both formal and informal power over day-to-day 
responsibilities and the workplace environment.151 
Although the Fifth Circuit is the most restrictive in its approach to 
coworker retaliation, other circuits have also imposed tougher limits 
on employer liability for coworker retaliation than they apply to 
sexual harassment by coworkers, albeit with some uncertainty about 
the extent of the difference.152  The Eighth Circuit’s evolution in its 
treatment of coworker retaliation illustrates the difficulties courts 
have faced in calibrating an approach to employer liability for 
coworker retaliation.153  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,154 the Eighth 
Circuit refused to recognize a retaliation claim based on coworker 
harassment, on the grounds that retaliation by coworkers could not 
amount to a materially adverse employment action.155  After the 
Burlington Northern decision, in which the Supreme Court held the 
materially adverse doctrine under § 703 of Title VII to be 
inapplicable to a retaliation claim under § 704,156 the Eighth Circuit 
changed course.  The court ruled that coworker retaliation may be 
actionable if it is sufficiently severe to chill a reasonable employee 
from complaining but applied a different employer liability standard 
than the negligence standard governing coworker harassment 
claims.157 
For coworker retaliation to be actionable, the Eighth Circuit 
explained, the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s failure to take 
reasonable corrective action was because of the plaintiff’s 
participation in the protected activity.158  In the case announcing this 
rule, the plaintiff, who was white, was racially harassed for having 
148. See Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App’x 442, 449–50 (5th Cir. 2014).
149. See id. at 449.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See infra notes 153–96 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
154. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
155. See Manning v. Met Life, 127 F.3d 686, 692–93 (8th Cir. 1997).
156. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57.
157. See Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 618 (8th Cir. 2007).
158. See id. at 619.
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married a black woman.159  After he complained about the 
harassment, and after he testified in a racial harassment case brought 
by an African American coworker, a white coworker retaliated 
against him.160  The court granted summary judgment to the 
employer, reasoning that because the plaintiff could not show that the 
employer’s failure to respond to the coworker’s harassing conduct 
was motivated by the plaintiff’s protected conduct, the employer 
could not be held liable for the coworker’s retaliation.161  The 
difference between this rule for coworker retaliation and the standard 
of liability for coworker sexual harassment is apparent.162  Employer 
liability for coworker harassment stems from the employer’s failure 
to take appropriate corrective action once the employer is on notice 
of the harassment, with no requirement to prove that the employer’s 
failure to respond was motivated by the plaintiff’s protected class.163  
Employer liability for sexual harassment is grounded in a theory of 
negligence based on the employer’s failure to reasonably respond 
once on notice of the harassment,164 while the court’s approach to 
coworker retaliation rests on a theory of intentional wrongdoing.165 
Other circuits have also required some showing of employer intent 
or wrongdoing beyond mere negligence to support employer liability 
for coworker harassment.166  A leading example is the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College.167  The 
plaintiff there alleged that she was sexually harassed by two 
individuals she worked for and then experienced retaliation for 
complaining, including sabotage of her work, worse assignments, and 
other unfair treatment by coworkers.168  The district court instructed 
the jury that the plaintiff had the burden to prove that the employer’s 
retaliatory actions constituted intentional discrimination.169  The 
plaintiff challenged the instruction on appeal, arguing that it 
incorrectly foreclosed a retaliation claim predicated on coworker 
retaliation.170  The Tenth Circuit agreed that coworker retaliation can 
159. See id. at 614.
160. See id. at 614–15.
161. See id. at 614.
162. See infra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
163. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 338 (6th Cir. 2008).
164. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 759 (1998).
165. See Carpenter, 481 F.3d at 618.
166. See infra notes 167–74 and accompanying text.
167. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
168. See id. at 1257.
169. See id. at 1263.
170. See id. at 1262.
18 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
be the basis for employer liability, but disagreed with the plaintiff’s 
argument that the standard for employer liability in such cases is 
mere negligence.171  The court explained that: 
[B]ecause harassment must be intentional on the part of the
employer, we hold that an employer can only be liable for
coworkers’ retaliatory harassment where its supervisory or
management personnel either (1) orchestrate the harassment
or (2) know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such
a manner as to condone and encourage the coworkers’
actions.172
The court’s intent-based approach differs in two respects from a 
pure negligence standard: first, constructive knowledge of the 
retaliation is not enough,173 and second, the employer’s fault must 
exceed a mere failure to respond and reach the level of encouraging 
the coworkers’ retaliatory actions.174  A district court in the Tenth 
Circuit later described this liability standard as recognizing a Title 
VII claim for coworker retaliation “in a very limited context.”175 
A post-Gunnell district court decision from the Tenth Circuit 
reveals the distance between the “condone or encourage” standard 
and a pure negligence standard.176  In Ferguson v. Associated 
Wholesale Grocers, Inc.,177 after experiencing severe and persistent 
sexual harassment from a colleague at work, the plaintiff reported the 
sexual harassment to a supervisor.178  The supervisor helpfully 
responded that he would help her out if she had sex with him.179  
Eventually, after the plaintiff pursued other channels, the employer 
investigated her allegations, found them substantiated, and fired the 
171. See id. at 1264–66.  The court’s opinion, decided before Burlington Northern, first
grappled with the question of whether coworker retaliation can ever be an adverse
action, concluding that it may, if sufficiently severe.  See id. at 1264 (citing Berry v.
Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986–87 (10th Cir. 1996)) (finding a coworker’s
initiation of a criminal complaint against the plaintiff, at management’s direction, in
retaliation for complaining about discrimination, was an adverse action).
172. Id. at 1265.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Farrier v. Nicholson, No. CIV-06-825-D, 2008 WL 1882848, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Apr.
24, 2008).
176. See generally Ferguson v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 961,
971–72 (D. Kan. 2007).
177. Id. at 961.
178. See id. at 964.
179. See id.
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harasser.180  That was only the beginning of the plaintiff’s ordeal, 
however.181  When she returned to work after being placed on paid 
administrative leave,182 she was harassed for having the harasser 
fired.183  Her tires were slashed, she received threatening phone calls 
from inside the warehouse where she worked, and she was the 
subject of hostile epithets (including such gems as “‘whore’, ‘bitch’, 
‘slut’ and ‘liar’”).184  At one point, two cans of soda were thrown at 
her when she turned away, and one of them hit her in the back.185  
Aware of the retaliatory harassment, the employer offered to reassign 
her to a position outside the warehouse until things “settled down.”186  
She did not want to be reassigned, however, and pressed the 
employer to investigate and take corrective action.187  The employer 
instead offered to install a listening device on the plaintiff’s home 
phone to try to intercept retaliatory phone calls.188  The plaintiff 
declined this option too, choosing instead to install a call blocker to 
block calls from the number used to make the retaliatory phone 
calls.189  Because the plaintiff did not know the identity of the 
retaliators (even the name calling was behind her back from a 
distance in the warehouse, and she could not see the perpetrators nor 
recognize their voices), the employer claimed that there was little it 
could do.190  The employer did hold a meeting to reiterate its policy 
against retaliation, but it did not investigate or interview anyone to 
try to identify the retaliatory harassers.191  Despite these failings, the 
court granted summary judgment to the employer on the retaliation 
claim.192 
Applying the liability standard from Gunnell, the court explained 
that an employer is liable for coworker retaliation only when 
180. See id. at 966–67.
181. See id. at 967.
182. Id. at 966.  The employer placed the plaintiff—not the accused harasser—on
administrative leave while it investigated her allegations.  Id.







190. See id. at 967–68.
191. See id. at 968.
192. Id. at 971–72.  However, the court denied the employer’s motion for summary
judgment on the sexual harassment claim for failure to establish the applicable
affirmative defense because the plaintiff reported the harassment without any
unreasonable delay.  Id. at 970.
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supervisory or management personnel either orchestrated the 
retaliation or knew about it and acquiesced so as to condone and 
encourage it.193  The court rejected the plaintiff’s theory of liability 
that the employer knew of the retaliation, failed to investigate, and 
“threw up [its] hands” because it did not already know the identity of 
the perpetrators.194  Instead, the court found that the employer took 
enough responsive actions to dispel any inference that it condoned or 
encouraged the retaliation.195  By rejecting mere negligence, the 
“encourage or condone” standard effectively demands a showing of 
wrongdoing akin to intentionality.196 
Not all courts explicitly treat coworker retaliation more stringently 
than coworker harassment, however, in marking the boundaries of 
employer liability.197  The courts most receptive to coworker 
retaliation claims borrow the familiar “knew or should have known” 
negligence-based standard from coworker sexual harassment cases 
and extend it to cases involving retaliation by coworkers.198  These 
courts justify this choice in terms of the similarity between the two 
forms of coworker misconduct.199  An influential case from the Sixth 
Circuit announced its decision to hold employers liable for failing to 
take reasonable remedial action in response to known retaliatory 
harassment in a case that revealed the blurriness of the line separating 
coworker retaliation from coworker harassment.200  In the oft-cited 
case of Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, three women claimed they were 
sexually harassed by the same male coworker, and one of them, 
along with a fourth woman, sued for retaliation based on retaliatory 
conduct by the same coworker.201  The facts stand out because of the 
virulence of both the sexual harassment and the subsequent 
retaliation.202   
193. Id. at 971.
194. Id. at 971–72.
195. See id. at 971.  The court cited the employer’s actions of offering to install a phone
tracking device, offering to transfer her out of the warehouse, calling a meeting to
inform employees of its policy against retaliation, viewing the security tapes to,
unsuccessfully, try to ascertain who threw the soda cans, and granting the plaintiff a
leave of absence after the soda incident.  Id.
196. Id.; see also supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 198–217 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 214–28 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 225–36 and accompanying text.
200. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 347 (6th Cir. 2008).
201. Id. at 326.  Although they filed suit under Ohio’s antidiscrimination statute, the court
borrowed from Title VII, noting that the state statute tracked Title VII.  Id. at 332.
202. See id. at 327–44.
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The coworker was a serial sexual harasser, accosting and lewdly 
propositioning multiple women.203  After one of the women reported 
his conduct and it was under investigation, someone set fire to her 
car.204  She suspected it was the harasser and reported it to the 
employer.205  The employer never investigated the car fire, however, 
and instead faulted the woman for accusing her male coworker of 
setting fire to the car without proof that he did it.206  Meanwhile, the 
employer’s sexual harassment investigation determined that the 
coworker sexually harassed two of the women.207  Nevertheless, the 
employer took no disciplinary action against him at that time, 
ostensibly because, when the employer previously attempted to fire 
him for prior sexual harassment, the harasser was granted 
reinstatement after filing a grievance with the union.208  Even though 
the employer’s own sexual harassment investigator found that the 
more recent allegations of sexual harassment likely occurred, the 
company told the complaining woman that it could not “substantiate” 
her allegations.209  Eventually, after more women came forward with 
similar allegations, the coworker was finally terminated for sexual 
harassment, and the union grievance committee upheld the 
termination.210  Soon after the harasser was fired, one of the women 
had gasoline poured into her basement and her house set on fire.211  
At that point, an investigation began into the two fires (the car fire 
and the house fire).212  While that investigation was underway, the 
coworker, who was fired for sexual harassment, shot his girlfriend 
and killed himself.213 
The Sixth Circuit held that an employer may be liable for 
“manifest[] indifference or unreasonableness” in response to 
203. Id. at 327–31.
204. Id. at 329.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 338.
208. Id. at 344.
209. Id. at 329.
210. Id. at 331.  One of the supervisors told the investigator that the alleged harasser’s
“primary target is single black women.”  Id.  Perhaps that explains why it took so
many women complaining about the coworker’s sexual harassment to get him fired.
Id. at 327–28.  Catharine MacKinnon famously said it typically takes three women
claiming sexual harassment by the same person to be believed.  MacKinnon, supra
note 40.  Perhaps it takes even more when the women are women of color.  See id.
211. Hawkins, 517 F.3d at 331.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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coworker retaliation of which it knew or should have known.214  
Although the court insisted that this was not a “mere negligence” 
standard, it analogized employer fault for coworker retaliation to the 
standard of liability for coworker sexual harassment.215  The 
obligation to avoid manifest indifference and unreasonableness 
requires an employer response that is reasonably calculated to end the 
retaliation.216  In the case at hand, the company’s failure to 
investigate the plaintiff’s charge, that the coworker had set fire to her 
car after she reported him for sexual harassment, satisfied the 
standard and gave rise to actionable retaliation.217 
Other circuit courts too have looked to the liability standard for 
coworker harassment to formulate the rule for employer liability in 
coworker retaliation cases.218  An early adopter, the Second Circuit 
first announced this rule in a case involving coworker retaliation for 
racial harassment, Richardson v. New York State Department of 
Corrections.219  The coworkers’ retaliatory acts in that case included 
putting hair in the complainant’s food, placing manure in her parking 
space, shooting rubber bands at her, and vandalizing her car.220  The 
employer responded flippantly to the plaintiff when it learned of 
these actions, suggesting that she try mediation and telling her that 
attitudes are hard to change.221  The court denied the employer’s 
motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim, holding that 
unchecked retaliatory coworker harassment, if severe enough, is 
actionable under the same standard of employer liability that governs 
coworker harassment.222 
The Third Circuit also regards coworker harassment as the model 
for employer liability for coworker retaliation.223  In an influential 
case recognizing coworker retaliation claims under Title VII, Jensen 
v. Potter, the court reversed the district court’s decision that
214. Id. at 338 (quoting Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir.
1997)).  The Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for two of the
plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claims.  Id. at 327.
215. Id. at 338.
216. See id. at 342–43.
217. Id. at 349.  However, the employer’s prompt investigation of the house fire warranted
summary judgment for the employer on that plaintiff’s retaliation claim.  Id.
218. See infra notes 219–28 and accompanying text.
219. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr., 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 1999).
220. Id. at 446–47.
221. Id. at 447.
222. Id. at 446.
223. See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 448–51 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other
grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
2019] Coworker Retaliation 23 
coworker retaliation did not violate Title VII.224  While noting a split 
in the circuits on the issue, the court sided with the majority that have 
recognized a claim for retaliatory harassment.225  The court saw no 
reason for applying a higher standard of employer liability to 
coworker retaliatory harassment than courts apply to coworker sexual 
harassment, which it understood to be grounded in a theory of 
employer negligence.226  Numerous courts have followed suit and, 
after considering the uncertain state of the law,227 have settled upon 
the “knew or should have known” negligence standard for coworker 
retaliation.228 
The negligence-only courts have a better understanding of the 
relationship between retaliation and discrimination and the 
implications for employer liability.  Courts applying a higher 
standard of liability to coworker retaliation than to coworker 
harassment ignore the slipperiness of the line separating retaliatory 
harassment from sexual (and other forms of discriminatory) 
harassment.229  A recent district court case, Parra v. City of White 
Plains, illustrates how sexual harassment and retaliation by 
coworkers can intertwine to give rise to the challenged conduct.230  In 
that case, a Hispanic female police officer claimed that she was 
sexually harassed by two fellow officers.231  Her complaints were 
followed by a substantial amount of negative harassment by other 
officers, including gender-specific name-calling and threats.232  The 
facts portray a hostile reaction to her sexual harassment complaint 
that was inextricably tied to her being a woman who complained 
about sexual harassment by men on the force.233  Where retaliatory 
224. Id. at 454.
225. Id. at 448.
226. Id. at 452–53.
227. See cases cited infra note 228.
228. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 95 (1st Cir. 2005); see Madeja v. MPB
Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1044–45 (N.H. 2003) (expressing disagreement with Gunnell
v. Utah Valley State College and finding no justification for imposing a higher
standard for coworker retaliation than for coworker harassment).
229. See infra notes 230–36 and accompanying text.
230. See Parra v. City of White Plains, 48 F. Supp. 3d 542, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
231. Id. at 547.
232. Id. at 549.  Gender-specific insults frequently appear in retaliatory harassment against
women who report sexual harassment.  See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1335
(7th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff’s coworkers called plaintiff a “fucking bitch” for
reporting sexual harassment).  See generally Flockhart v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.,
192 F. Supp. 2d 947, 967 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (concluding that the terms “‘slut,’
‘whore,’ ‘bitch,’ and a ‘cunt’” are gender-based insults).
233. See Parra, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 547–49.
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and discriminatory reasons intertwine to motivate a coworker’s 
hostile treatment of the plaintiff, the same underlying conduct can 
form the basis for both a retaliation claim and a harassment claim.234  
Neither the court nor the employer will likely be able to accurately 
parse and apportion the retaliatory and discriminatory underpinnings 
of a particular hostile act.235  The impossibility of the task warrants 
imposing the same obligation on employers to respond to coworker 
retaliation as they are required to do in responding to sexual 
harassment by coworkers.236 
Even when negligence is the standard used for determining 
employer liability for coworker retaliation, uncertainty remains about 
how the standard applies to retaliation claims specifically.237  One 
issue courts are likely to face in coworker retaliation claims based on 
a negligence theory, is how to evaluate whether the employer had 
notice of the retaliation.238  What constitutes notice of coworker 
retaliation, and who must receive it?239  Even for coworker sexual 
harassment, imputing notice to the employer can be tricky.240  Some 
courts require notice to come through the employer’s official anti-
harassment policy.241  Others require notice to be directed to a person 
who meets the definition of a supervisor under Vance, rather than to 
persons who are mere coworkers.242  But modeling how notice is 
handled for coworker sexual harassment may not chart the best path 
234. See Rhonda Reaves, Retaliatory Harassment: Sex and the Hostile Coworker as the
Enforcer of Workplace Norms, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 403, 429 (discussing how
conduct can be a form of both retaliation and harassment).
235. See id. at 405–07, 429–31.
236. See id. at 405–07.
237. See infra text accompanying notes 238–46.
238. See Thomas J. Hook, Jr., Defining Employer Liability in Sexual Harassment and Title
VII Retaliation Claims: The Supreme Court Creates the Same Problem Twice, 13
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 121, 135 (2008).
239. Cf. Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 96–97 (1st Cir. 2005) (concluding that
there was evidence of actual notice where plaintiff complained to persons defined as
“senior” and “high-level” supervisors and the deputy commissioner).
240. See Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:
Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 UNIV. DET. MERCY L. REV. 817,
827–828 (1994).
241. Id.  In coworker harassment cases, the failure to report harassment through official
channels has blocked employer liability based on the employer’s knowledge and
failure to respond.  See, e.g., Spencer v. Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 Fed. Appx. 442 (5th
Cir. 2014) (holding that employer did not have notice of coworker racial harassment
where plaintiff, an apprentice, complained about the harassment to his union steward,
who was not an employee, even though the union steward brought the complaint to a
superintendent, who responded merely by saying the plaintiff should put it in writing).
242. See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 96–97.
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for coworker retaliation claims.243  If the channels used to report 
coworker sexual harassment resulted in retaliation, the plaintiff may 
reasonably choose not to go down that same path again; choosing 
instead to report the retaliation to persons outside of official 
channels, who nonetheless have responsibility under employer 
policies to report up the chain of command.244  Relatedly, an 
important question in the #MeToo era is whether social media 
disclosures, when read by agents of the employer, might provide 
notice to the employer, either of the underlying harassment or of any 
subsequent retaliation.245  Imposing tight limits on the channels and 
persons that effectively impute notice of retaliatory actions may 
hamper the ability of Title VII to offer meaningful protection from 
coworker retaliation.246 
Rather than track the same strictures that limit employer notice of 
coworker retaliation, retaliation law should take a more expansive 
approach to notice, precisely because of the well-known likelihood 
that complaints about sexual harassment will provoke retaliatory 
reactions by others, including coworkers, in the workplace.247  
Constructive notice should play a greater role in coworker retaliation 
cases by putting the onus on the employer, once aware that plaintiff 
has complained about sexual harassment, to be watchful for signs of 
retaliation.248  Incentivizing a more proactive employer stance might 
deter some retaliatory responses from occurring.249 
An even greater area of uncertainty about how a negligence 
standard applies to coworker retaliation is in calibrating the 
243. See Reaves, supra note 234, at 428–29.
244. See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[R]epresentatives
admitted that the proper procedure for an employee to report a claim of harassment
was to notify his or her team leader. Once a team leader received a complaint from an
employee, it was the team leader’s duty to report the complaint up the chain of
command to his or her supervisor. Therefore, by maintaining a policy that permitted
workers to report sexual harassment claims to team leaders, L.L. Bean provided these
team leaders with actual authority to receive notice of sexual harassment complaints
on behalf of the company, and their knowledge was imputed to it.”).
245. See Kristen N. Coletta, Sexual Harassment on Social Media: Why Traditional
Company Sexual Harassment Policies Are Not Enough and How to Fix It, 48 SETON
HALL L. REV. 449, 460–463, 470–471 (2018).
246. See Reaves, supra note 234, at 432.
247. See id. at 433.
248. See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
249. See id. at 25, 33, 56.
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reasonableness of the employer’s response.250  This is, at-best, a gray 
area even for coworker sexual harassment, and coworker retaliation 
claims likely pose additional challenges.251  What constitutes a 
reasonable response to actionable conduct in the workplace has long 
been contested.252  In coworker sexual harassment cases, courts 
require the employer, once on notice of the harassment, to take 
prompt and appropriate action “reasonably calculated” to end the 
harassment.253  Factors relevant to the reasonableness of the 
employer’s response include: whether the employer conducted an 
investigation, the promptness of any response, the reasonableness of 
any remedial measures and, if ineffective, whether stronger measures 
followed.254 
Despite the open-endedness of this inquiry, some principles and 
outer limits are discernible.255  Ignoring, not investigating, and failing 
to follow up on known coworker retaliation is an unreasonable 
employer response that may render the employer liable.256  Even 
when the employer does respond, certain actions may be too little, 
too late to be reasonable.257  Waiting an unreasonable amount of time 
to act may render the employer liable, as occurred in Jensen, where 
management personnel waited nineteen months before meeting with 
250. See generally Polanco v. UPS Freight Servs. Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 470, 496–97
(D.P.R. 2016) (finding a variety of factors that could result in reasonably calculated
action by the employer to prevent a claim of negligence).
251. See id. at 496–99.
252. See infra notes 253–71 and accompanying text.
253. Polanco, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 496.
254. Id. at 497 (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment on coworker sexual
harassment claim where the employer gave warnings and took mild measures, but the
harassment continued without appropriate follow-through by the employer).
255. See infra notes 256–271 and accompanying text.
256. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 81, 95–97 (1st Cir. 2005) (not taking
action and speculating that harassment will likely become ten times worse after the
plaintiff’s shift change survived summary judgement on the knew or should have
known and failed to take reasonable corrective action standard of liability); see Patton
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 234 F.3d 1269, 4–6 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding retaliation
verdict where employer failed to follow up on or condemn coworker’s retaliatory
harassment); see Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 447 (2d
Cir. 1999) (replying to complaint of coworker retaliation by suggesting that the
plaintiff try mediation and reminding her that it might be “hard to change attitudes”
was unreasonable).
257. Cf. Kelley v. Conco Cos., 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 659–71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(considering the employer’s action of moving the employee to a different job site and
blaming the work culture created enough of a genuine issue of material fact to deny
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
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the offending coworker—an intervention that occurred only at the 
initiative of a new (female) supervisor.258 
In a closer case, Knox v. Indiana,259 the court upheld a jury verdict 
in a coworker retaliation case based on a shorter, one-month delay by 
the employer in responding.260  In that case, after the plaintiff 
reported a supervisor’s sexual harassment, she was met with threats 
by coworkers to make her life “hell,” to “get her,” and a campaign of 
“insulting and demeaning statements” and “vicious gossip.”261 When 
told about the campaign of coworker harassment, the employer’s 
affirmative action officer did “nothing at the time,” telling the 
plaintiff that she could not take any action without the plaintiff 
providing names of the persons retaliating.262  Because much of the 
harassment was behind the plaintiff’s back, that was a tall order.263  
About a month after this exchange, the plaintiff was able to find out 
the names of several of the retaliatory harassers and provided them to 
the affirmative action officer, who subsequently investigated, 
counseled the offending employees, and recommended disciplinary 
action against one of them.264  Regarding it as a close case, the court 
upheld the jury verdict for the plaintiff, finding that the jury could 
have reasonably concluded that the affirmative action officer’s initial 
response amounted to a “brush-off” followed by an unwarranted 
delay given the extent and severity of the retaliatory harassment.265 
While these principles impose some affirmative obligations on 
employers to respond to coworker retaliation,266 there are limits to 
what the law requires.267  Importantly, courts do not require the 
employer to actually stop the coworker’s retaliation, as long as the 
employer’s response was “reasonably calculated” to end the 
retaliation.268  Nor do courts find it unreasonable as a matter of law to 
take no remedial action if the employer investigated but found 
insufficient evidence of wrongdoing.269  As the Third Circuit clarified 
258. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 447, 452–53 (3d Cir. 2006).
259. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996).
260. Id. at 1335–36.
261. Id. at 1331, 1335.
262. Id. at 1330–31.
263. See id. at 1335.
264. Id. at 1331.
265. Id. at 1335–36.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 255–65.
267. See infra text accompanying notes 268–71.
268. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114
F.3d 407, 412–13 (3d Cir. 1997)).
269. See Knabe, 114 F.3d at 412–13.
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in Jensen, Title VII is satisfied if the employer promptly investigates 
allegations of coworker retaliation but finds insufficient evidence to 
take disciplinary action.270  Conversely, if the coworker retaliation 
does in fact stop after the employer’s response, courts have found the 
employer’s response to be per se reasonable, even if it could be 
faulted as insufficient on its face.271 
While these principles offer some guidance, they still leave 
substantial gray area as to what is required for a reasonable employer 
response to coworker retaliation.272  One risk to plaintiffs is that 
courts may believe it is reasonable to give employers more latitude in 
responding to coworker retaliation than in responding to coworker 
sexual harassment.273  Although not tethered to the legal framework 
governing employer liability, courts have expressed sympathy for the 
emotional bonds that could lead coworkers to side with friends and 
colleagues accused of harassment274 and have cautioned that 
retaliation law should not interfere with the expression of support for 
coworkers who have been accused of sexual harassment.275  For 
example, the court in Noviello v. City of Boston observed a “unique” 
difficulty in adjudicating retaliatory harassment claims, as compared 
to sexual harassment claims, in that there is a plausibly defensible 
purpose motivating employees to side with an accused friend or 
avoid the complainant in order to stay out of the fray.276  Judicial 
sympathy for coworkers whose inclination is to side with the accused 
may cause courts to be more sympathetic to employers who decline 
to intervene in coworker retaliation and more likely to pronounce an 
employer’s minimal efforts as reasonable.277  The perception that 
coworker retaliation is more excusable than coworker sexual 
270. See Jensen, 435 F.3d at 453.
271. Id. (citing Knabe, 114 F.3d at 411–12 & n.8) (“An effective remedy—one that stops
the harassment—is adequate per se.”); see also Ryan v. Shulkin, No. 1:15-CV-02384,
2017 WL 6270209, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2017) (holding that the plaintiff cannot
show the employer’s response to be unreasonable if the retaliatory harassment
stopped soon after she reported it).
272. See supra notes 250–54 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 276–78 and accompanying text.
274. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 93 (1st Cir. 2005).
275. See id.
276. Id. at 92–93.
277. See id. at 93 (“We think . . . that those actions that are hurtful to a complainant only
because coworkers do not take [their] side in a work-related dispute may not be
considered as contributing to a retaliatory hostile work environment.”); see also Ryan
v. Shulkin, No. 1:15-CV-02384, 2017 WL 6270209, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2017)
(finding that simply conducting a mandatory in-service training to address an
employee’s complaints of sexual harassment was a reasonable response by the
employer because the offensive conduct stopped).
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harassment may create an unstated higher threshold for retaliation 
plaintiffs to prove unreasonableness in the employer’s responsive 
action.278 
This same understanding of the possible legitimacy behind a 
coworker’s inclination to “circle the wagons” and side with the 
accused may lead both courts and employers to believe there is little 
they can do to effectively prevent and correct the coworker dynamics 
that lead to retaliation.279  Courts may view such dynamics as 
ungovernable, falling in the realm of the social rather than the formal, 
professional environment, such that they are sympathetic to 
employers who effectively throw up their hands when faced with the 
difficult task of preventing or halting coworker retaliation, placing 
only weak obligations on employers to take corrective action.280  To 
be sure, this can be a problem in coworker sexual harassment claims 
too, but the inclination to view sexual harassers as aberrational bad 
actors may make it easier for courts to conclude that the employer 
could have, and should have, done something to weed out the sexual 
harasser.281 
It is not at all clear, however, that courts’ perceptions of the 
intractability of mounting an effective employer response to 
coworker retaliation corresponds to reality.282  In Jensen, where the 
278. See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 92–93.  Judicially enforced obligations on employers to
remedy coworker retaliation can be especially complex in academic settings, where
academic freedom is involved.  See, e.g., Shott v. Katz, 829 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding § 1981’s ban on retaliation for opposing race discrimination was not violated
by fellow university professor’s refusal to collaborate with the plaintiff on research
for retaliatory reasons, citing first amendment concerns that a contrary ruling would
raise).
279. See supra notes 274–76 and accompanying text.
280. See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 93 (“The very act of filing a charge against a coworker will
cause tension and result in a less agreeable workplace.”); see also Brooks v. City of
San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because an employer cannot force
employees to socialize with one another, ostracism suffered at the hands of coworkers
cannot constitute an adverse employment action.”); cf. Greer v. City of Escodido,
Nos. D038093, D038644, 2002 WL 31555286, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002)
(“[T]he alleged lack of civility of coworkers does not constitute adverse employment
action upon which a retaliation claim can be based. Absent facts that an employer
instructed coworkers to avoid or shun the plaintiff in retaliation for asserting a
harassment complaint, there is no actionable retaliation.”).
281. See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 92–93 (stating that there is seldom, if ever, a defensible
purpose behind discriminatory harassment as opposed to retaliatory harassment which
requires a more nuanced analysis for determining whether the purpose was proper).
282. See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 629–31 (arguing that coworker reactions to
harassment and to the reporting of harassment are largely determined by the
employer’s actions and managerial responses).
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plaintiff experienced persistent and escalating coworker retaliation 
for over a year, once the employer finally held a formal meeting with 
the retaliating coworker, the retaliation stopped immediately.283  But 
the perception, if not the reality, of greater difficulty managing and 
deterring coworker retaliation than harassment by coworkers may 
nudge courts to accept lower-level responses as reasonable in 
retaliation cases.284 
With all of this uncertainty, employer liability for coworker 
retaliation stands out as an under-developed area of retaliation law at 
a time when courts have otherwise been highly attentive to the 
development of the law governing retaliation claims.285  The legal 
framework treats coworker retaliation as a less-favored stepchild in 
relation to other discrimination and retaliation claims.286  The second-
tier status of employer liability for coworker retaliation claims maps 
onto the well-worn public/private dichotomy by treating informal 
relationships and interactions between colleagues at work as more 
private than public, and farther from the law’s legitimate reach.287  
Doing so understates the harm and silencing power of coworker 
interactions, and their centrality to the workplace.288  The social 
dimensions of workplace relationships overlap with the professional 
dimensions, making coworker relationships integrally connected to 
job performance and job satisfaction.289  Indeed, changes in 
workplace structures that flatten lines of authority and push 
collaborative work cultures have made coworker relationships all the 
more powerful in shaping professional opportunities.290 
These loose chickens may come home to roost in the #MeToo era.  
Judicial reluctance to police exercises of informal power in the 
workplace and to intrude into the “social” realm of workplace 
283. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006).
284. See supra notes 272–81 and accompanying text.
285. See discussion supra Section II.A.
286. See supra notes 281–83 and accompanying text.
287. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117,
120–22 (2011).
288. See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 613, 629 (discussing the impact of coworker
relationships on productivity and moral).
289. See Rosenbury, supra note 287, at 129–34 (discussing findings of social science
research on the role of coworkers in succeeding at work); see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, 
WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY
20, 27 (2003); see also Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1948,
1959 (2000).
290. See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 613 (discussing the centrality of coworker
relationships to work productivity and employee job performance).
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dynamics does not bode well for protecting women who complain of 
sexual harassment from a #MeToo backlash.291 
B. When Does Coworker Retaliation Deter a Reasonable Employee
from Complaining?
Not all negative reactions to employees for opposing 
discrimination are unlawful.292  Retaliation must rise to a certain 
level of severity to violate Title VII.293  The Supreme Court 
formulated the governing standard in Burlington Northern & Santa 
Fe Railway v. White, requiring the retaliation to rise to a level of 
severity such that “it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”294  In 
keeping with the Court’s emphasis on the purpose of the retaliation 
claim, the Court explained that the standard should take into account 
how the alleged retaliation would likely affect an employee in the 
circumstances of the plaintiff.295  Although the Court described this 
as an objective standard, it instructed lower courts to apply it to the 
situated employee by considering the relevant circumstances that 
might impact the employee’s likelihood of complaining.296  For 
example, the Court noted that a shift change might be trivial to many 
workers but chilling to a single mother for whom predictability in 
work schedules was necessary to coordinate her children’s school 
and day care schedules.297  The Court had little trouble determining 
that the retaliatory actions in Burlington Northern, assigning the 
plaintiff more difficult job responsibilities and placing her on an 
unpaid leave (for which she subsequently received backpay), met the 
standard.298  The Court distinguished such actionable retaliation from 
what it called “normal” workplace slights of snubbing and shunning, 
which fall outside the reach of Title VII’s protection from 
retaliation.299 
The retaliation in Burlington Northern was undertaken by 
supervisors who had the authority to change the plaintiff’s job 
291. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
292. See Hernandez v. Yellow Transp. Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012).
293. See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449–50 (3d Cir. 2006).
294. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Rochon
v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
295. See id. at 69.
296. Id. at 68–69.
297. Id. at 69.
298. See id. at 70–73.
299. Id. at 68.
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responsibilities and work status.300  Post-Burlington Northern case 
law, lower courts suggest that retaliatory actions by coworkers are 
less likely to meet the standard.301  Courts applying the Burlington 
Northern framework tend to dismiss retaliatory harassment by 
coworkers as “pranks,” placing coworker harassment on the same 
footing as the “snubbing” that the Court indicated was part and parcel 
of a “normal” workplace.302  Sometimes courts even place coworker 
sabotage and vandalism in this category, despite its progression well 
past the point of social ostracism or snubbing.303  In one such case, 
the retaliation included loading up the complaining employee’s trailer 
with garbage dozens of times over four years, requiring the 
complainant to repeatedly clear off the trailer in order to ready it for 
use on the job.304  The court dismissed the incidents as “pranks” and 
held that it did not meet the Burlington Northern threshold for 
actionable retaliation.305 
As commentators have noted, lower courts tend to assume that 
complainants are resilient enough to hold their own and will tolerate 
a good bit of pushback from colleagues without it weakening their 
300. Id. at 57–59.
301. See Fercello v. County of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1081 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that
coworkers’ actions making plaintiff feel unwelcome at meetings, rolling their eyes at
her, interrupting her, and ignoring her contributions were not sufficiently severe to
support her retaliation claim); see also Nordike v. Verizon Bus., Inc., No. 12-2686-
JAR, 2014 WL 4749185 at *10 (D. Kan. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding that a statement by
“difficult employee” on a conference call that he would never work with plaintiff
again was not materially adverse); see also Perkins v. Harvey, 368 F. App’x 640, 648
(6th Cir. 2010) (finding that a coworker’s statement that he did not believe in filing
lawsuits or EEO complaints was not materially adverse); see also Verrinder v. Rite
Aid Corp., No. 3:06cv00024, 2007 WL 4357595, at *19  (W.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2007)
(finding that a coworker’s warning, “[d]o you know what happens in a lawsuit?  The
lawyers will know everything about your life and it will come out in court.  It won’t
be pretty,” would not be materially adverse to a reasonable employee, although
acknowledging that “a naïve employee might find [the coworker’s] statement to be
materially adverse”).  But see Burrell v. Shephard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13–14 (D.D.C.
2018) (denying summary judgment for employer on plaintiff’s retaliation claim where
plaintiff alleged “that her coworkers refused to speak to her, ‘making it very difficult
for her to perform her assigned tasks,’” and “made derogatory comments about [her]
on social media,” and sent an email questioning her motives for reporting the alleged
discrimination, in addition to other retaliatory acts).
302. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68; see Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481
F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 2007).
303. See Carpenter, 481 F.3d at 618–19.
304. Id.  The plaintiff was also the target of a series of hostile and racist remarks, which he
learned about from other coworkers.  Id. at 614.
305. Id. at 618–19.
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resolve to complain.306  Professor Sandra Sperino has critiqued the 
case law for determining that certain actions do not meet the 
Burlington Northern standard as a matter of law because it ignores 
the Court’s directive to apply the objective reasonable person 
standard to the situated plaintiff and does not take into account all 
relevant circumstances.307  By not examining the circumstances that 
make a plaintiff vulnerable to coworker retaliation, this approach 
understates the harm of retaliation in particular cases in ways that are 
likely to chill #MeToo stories of workplace harassment.308 
The cases also minimize the deterrent force of retaliatory threats 
and other verbally abusive behavior.309  Threats of retaliation 
generally do not meet the Burlington Northern standard, even when 
made by supervisors.310  Harassing, shunning, and ostracizing also 
fall on the lawful side of the line.311  When the shunning and verbal 
offense comes from coworkers, courts are particularly 
circumspect.312  Verbal retaliation by coworkers typically falls short 
of what courts view as likely to chill a reasonable person from 
complaining.313 
The line that courts seem most comfortable enforcing separates 
run-of-the-mill retaliatory comments from specific threats of violence 
and physical harm.314  In Noviello v. City of Boston, for example, the 
306. See CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 428 (9th ed. 2017) (describing the post-Burlington
Northern lower court decisions as assuming that employees are made of “stern stuff”).
307. See Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031,
2052–55 (2015).
308. See id. at 2079–80.
309. See infra notes 310–13 and accompanying text.
310. See SULLIVAN & ZIMMER, supra note 306, at 429.
311. See Porter, supra note 2, at 54.
312. See cases cited infra note 313.
313. See Juarez v. Utah, 263 F. App’x 726, 733, 737 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding coworkers’
negative reactions to Latina dental assistant who filed a sexual harassment complaint
against the dentist, including comment that the complainant is “good only to do dishes
at the office,” would not have dissuaded a reasonable worker from complaining); see
Reeves v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:12-CV-00018, 2013 WL 2177918, at
*10 (M.D. Tenn. May 20, 2013) (finding that intimidating, unprofessional behavior,
and rudeness would not dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining); see Clay
v. Lafarge N. Am., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1030 (S.D. Iowa 2013) (finding that
shunning and ostracism at work did not satisfy the Burlington Northern standard); cf.
Ramsdell v. Huhtamaki, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D. Maine 2014) (finding that mere
rudeness, social ostracism, and staring were not severe enough to be qualifying
“anchoring events” within the limitations period to make the subsequent untimely
retaliation actionable).
314. See infra notes 315–19 and accompanying text.
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court acknowledged that rudeness, social ostracism, siding with the 
accused, and avoiding the complainant would all fail to satisfy the 
Burlington Northern standard, but distinguished the facts in Noviello, 
holding that they did meet the standard.315  The coworker retaliation 
in Noviello included physically threatening conduct, a false 
accusation of misconduct, and actions calculated to interfere with the 
plaintiff’s work performance; the court found these to be ubiquitous, 
severe, and having a “natural tendency to humiliate” a reasonable 
person.316  Similarly, the court in Jensen v. Potter emphasized that 
the nineteen months of retaliatory harassment by two coworkers went 
far beyond “the silent treatment” and siding with the accused over the 
complainant; rather, their actions crossed over to violent threats and 
vandalism.317  The retaliatory conduct included sneaking up behind 
the complainant and then frightening her with a loud clap, running 
toward her with a mail cart in threatening way as if to run her over, 
and vandalizing her car in the employee parking lot.318  As another 
court explained, getting the cold shoulder from coworkers does not 
cross the line, but one coworker repeatedly calling the plaintiff and 
threatening physical violence would dissuade a reasonable worker 
from complaining.319 
Although courts issue such pronouncements regularly and with 
great confidence, the empirical justification offered for them is thin 
or nonexistent.320  Indeed, the empirical research regarding what 
actions are likely to deter people from complaining about 
discrimination cuts in the opposite direction.321  In fact, shunning the 
complainant and siding with the accused appears highly likely to 
dissuade many, if not most, persons from complaining.322  Professor 
315. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 93–94 (1st Cir. 2005).
316. Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
317. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 2006).
318. Id. at 447.  Jensen was decided before Burlington Northern, but its rationale survives
that decision even though its precise holding, which assumed that retaliation is
governed by the same standard of material adversity that governs discrimination
claims under § 703 of Title VII, does not.  Compare id. at 448–49, with Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60–61 (2006).  In finding the pattern of
retaliatory harassment in Jensen to be sufficiently severe to be materially adverse
under § 703, the court’s reasoning necessarily means that the conduct would also meet
the Burlington Northern standard of likely to chill a reasonable employee from
complaining.  See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.
319. Ryan v. Shulkin, No. 1:15-CV-02384, 2017 WL 6270209, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8,
2017).
320. See infra notes 322–27 and accompanying text.
321. See infra notes 322–27 and accompanying text.
322. Sperino, supra note 307, at 2043, 2045.
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Sperino’s study of law students asking whether certain actions would 
dissuade them from reporting discrimination elicited affirmative 
responses to numerous kinds of actions courts have found unlikely to 
chill discrimination complaints.323  When asked whether social 
ostracism by coworkers might dissuade them from complaining, 50% 
of the law students surveyed responded affirmatively.324 
Social science research on the workplace also calls into question 
courts’ reluctance to find retaliatory acts by coworkers, as opposed to 
supervisors, to satisfy the Burlington Northern test.325  Research on 
workplace dynamics has found that the harms to employees from 
misconduct and ostracism by others at work is actually greater when 
coming from coworkers than from higher-ups.326  Coworker 
shunning, social exclusion, and incivility push targeted employees to 
leave their employers at a greater rate than similar conduct by 
supervisors.327 
Regardless of the organizational position of the retaliator, the 
literature reveals a gap between what actually deters employees from 
raising complaints about discrimination and what people, including 
judges, believe will stop people from complaining.328  People are 
more easily deterred from speaking out than is commonly realized.329  
The case law applying the Burlington Northern standard in the lower 
courts exposes that gap in stark relief, as courts hew to the line that 
ostracism, threats, and a great deal of other negative behaviors would 
not deter a reasonable person from complaining.330 
What explains the gap between judges’ predictions of what is 
reasonably chilling and real world experience?331  Law Professor 
Nicole Buonocore Porter speculates that federal judges, with their 
lifetime job security, have a particularly distorted understanding of 
323. Id. at 2043.
324. Id. at 2045.  Interestingly, 80% of the respondents said that a negative evaluation
would likely deter them from complaining, even though courts often find such actions
insufficiently severe to satisfy the Burlington Northern standard.  Id.
325. See Sandra L. Robinson et al., Coworkers Behaving Badly: The Impact of Coworker
Deviant Behavior upon Individual Employees, 1 ANN. REV. ORG. PSYCHOL. & ORG. 
BEHAV. 123, 129 (2014) (summarizing literature and finding harms from coworker
aggression and ostracism are greater than from persons higher in the organizational
hierarchy).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 127.
328. See Sperino, supra note 307, at 2033.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 2041.
331. See infra notes 332–47 and accompanying text.
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how job insecurity affects reasonable people in their calculations 
about whether to report discrimination.332  Her explanation has great 
intuitive appeal, but there seems to be an additional element of 
resistance when it comes to predicting reactions to coworker 
retaliation.333  A distinctive consideration driving the coworker 
retaliation decisions is judicial anxiety about how deeply courts 
would have to involve themselves in overseeing employer intrusions 
into the coworker dynamics of a workplace if snubbing and social 
ostracism met the standard.334  If more coworker negative reactions, 
short of violence, triggered an employer duty to respond, a 
reasonable response may need to be more nuanced than simply firing 
the hostile employee.335  Judicial supervision of employer responses 
to more subtle coworker interactions may trigger ham-fisted reactions 
that overreach into employee relationships, and instead of changing 
norms to support #MeToo callouts, result in greater backlash and 
#MeToo fatigue.336 
This is a legitimate concern with no easy answers.337  A few courts 
recognizing coworker retaliation claims have grappled with it 
forthrightly.338  In Jensen, the court expressed concern that, despite 
recognizing coworker retaliation as potentially actionable, the law 
should not interfere with the reality that strains on relationships are 
inevitable, stating “[s]ides will be chosen, lines will be drawn,” and 
former friends may become not so friendly.339  The court took pains 
to explain that “what the statute proscribes is retaliation, not loyalty 
to an accused coworker or a desire to avoid entanglement.”340  The 
court appears to be more concerned that the law leaves ample room 
for employers to allow “[m]ere expressions of opinion” than the 
chilling effect on complaining employees.341  In Jensen, the court 
found statements from coworkers that the harasser should not have 
332. Porter, supra note 2, at 55.
333. See infra notes 334–36 and accompanying text.
334. See generally Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (“[W]hen it comes to designing the optimum
system for reining in the discretion of supervisory employees, the courts are at sea and
it makes sense therefore to shift the responsibility entirely to the employer to create
and administer an effective system for the review and control of company actions
taken by supervisors in the exercise of their delegated authority.”).
335. See supra notes 252–57, 266–80 and accompanying text.
336. See infra notes 479–83 and accompanying text.
337. See infra notes 479–83 and accompanying text.
338. See infra notes 339–44 and accompanying text.
339. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 2006).
340. Id.
341. See id.
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been fired, that he “shouldn’t have to apologize for anything,” and 
that a petition to have the harasser rehired all failed the Burlington 
Northern standard.342  Title VII is “not ‘a general civility code,’” the 
court reiterated.343  The court in Noviello engaged in a similar 
analysis, adding that, unlike status-based harassment, there may well 
be a defensible purpose underlying retaliatory harassment, because 
there is “nothing inherently wrong” with supporting an accused 
friend or wanting to stay out of the fray by avoiding the 
complainant.344 
My reading of the cases is that judicial resistance to taking Title 
VII more deeply into the realm of coworker interactions has more to 
do with concerns about judicially enforced employer responses to 
employee expressions of support than the actual inhibitive effects on 
complaining employees, which may be quite devastating.345  The 
reality is that siding with the accused over the complaining employee 
and the risk of widespread shunning may well chill reasonable 
employees from complaining about sexual harassment,346 but the 
courts are loathe to force or incentivize employer surveillance of the 
social and relational aspects of work.347 
At one level, this is problematic for complainants and does not 
bode well for the continued traction of #MeToo, at least when it 
comes to calling out sexual harassment at work while remaining 
employed in the workplace where the harassment occurred.348  The 
“social” aspects of the job may not be severable from job 
performance and professional advancement, especially in workplace 
cultures where collaboration is key.349  Being ostracized by 
342. Id.; see Burlington N. & Santa Fey Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
343. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449 (quoting Oncale v. Sundance Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75,
80 (1998)).
344. Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 93 (1st Cir. 2005).
345. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.
346. See generally Porter, supra note 2, at 51, 55, 59 (explaining that many employees do
not report sexual harassment because they fear social ostracism or that no one will
believe them).
347. See generally Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 511 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that forcing an employer to
continuously monitor employees would be too expensive and invasive to their
privacy).
348. See generally Ferguson v. Associated Grocers, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967–68 (D.
Kan. 2007) (the employee who reported harassment received threatening phone calls
and had her tires slashed when she returned to work following administrative leave).
349. See sources cited supra note 289.
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coworkers on a rampage to support the accused might be enough to 
chill all but the most stalwart of complainants.350 
And yet, there are reasons to pause before pressing too far in the 
direction of capturing all negative coworker reactions as 
retaliation.351  If all reasonably chilling coworker interactions 
triggered the employer’s duty to take corrective action, Title VII 
might require employers to intrude deeply into coworker 
relationships and expression of authentic sentiments.352  Even setting 
aside the potential First Amendment implications of requiring 
employers to monitor employee expressions of support for either side 
in a contested allegation (which is beyond the scope of this essay), it 
is not clear that the most stringent legal approach would have the 
most positive impact in opening up the channels of dissent to sexual 
harassment.353  Shifting workplace norms against sexually harassing 
behaviors at work may require adequate space for airing differences 
of opinion about what happened and who is right, even if some of 
these expressions will inevitably be chilling.354 
Even while acknowledging this difficulty, it is possible to 
recognize the need for employers to allow room for expressing 
differences of opinion while still criticizing the lines that courts have 
drawn.355  It should not require coworker violence or threats of 
violence to cross the line from legitimate social interactions to 
actionable retaliation.356  Courts should be more attentive to how 
coworkers impact an employee’s ability to work and opportunities 
for advancement.357  It should not be too much to require expressions 
350. See Porter, supra note 2, at 55.
351. See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
352. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 511 (Posner, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the
constant surveillance of employees would invade their privacy and would be too
costly).
353. See Olivia B. Waxman, The Surprising Consequences of the Supreme Court Cases
that Changed Sexual Harassment Law 20 Years Ago, TIME (June 26, 2018),
https://time.com/5319966/sexual-harassment-scotus-anniversary/
[http://perma.cc/X9AU-2BY2].
354. See Valerie Bolden-Barrett, Study: Men and Women Disagree Over Impact and
Tracking of Harassment, HR DIVE (July 27, 2018), https://www.hrdive.com/news/
study-men-and-women-disagree-over-impact-and-tracking-of-harassment/528676/
[http://perma.cc/YEK6-N2N3].
355. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 73–74 (2005) (explaining
the importance of in-person discussions of social values at work).
356. See id. at 81–82.
357. See generally Rosabeth M. Kanter, The Impact of Hierarchical Structures on the
Work Behavior of Women and Men, 23 SOC. PROBS. 415, 420 (1975) (data supports
the proposition that employee relationships impact work performance and one’s
overall interest in the job).
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of support for the accused to be bound by professional norms and 
basic civility, even if hard and fast rules for such boundaries are 
elusive.358 
It remains to be seen how the #MeToo movement will affect the 
development of retaliation law as it responds to the murkiness of 
coworker interactions.359  Will courts judge coworker retaliation 
more or less likely to dissuade a reasonable employee from reporting 
harassment amidst the aftershocks of #MeToo?360  I can imagine two 
possible divergent paths.361 
One possibility is that the outpouring of #MeToo stories,362 and the 
increasing receptiveness of the public to listen to and believe them,363 
will persuade courts that the norms have shifted to encourage the 
telling of stories of sexual harassment, so that it should take more in 
the way of negative reactions to chill complainants.364  Especially for 
critics of the movement who are feeling under siege by an onslaught 
of #MeToo stories,365 the takeaway from #MeToo might be that 
women are now hellbent on telling their stories of harassment, and 
that the norms have swung far in the other direction.366  This view 
would support increased expectations for what coworkers would have 
to do to chill the reasonable employee from complaining.367 
358. See generally Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1796 (1992) (discussing the difficulty in
limiting speech in the workplace with First Amendment and Harassment Law
protections).
359. See MacKinnon, supra note 40.
360. See infra notes 362–75 and accompanying text.
361. See infra notes 362–75 and accompanying text.
362. See Anna Codrea-Rado, #MeToo Floods Social Media with Stories of Harassment
and Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/
technology/metoo-twitter-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/RL7F-T2EL].
363. See Dalvin Brown, 19 Million Tweets Later: A Look at #MeToo a Year After the
Hashtag Went Viral, USA TODAY (Oct. 13, 2018, 10:12 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/13/metoo-impact-hashtag-made- 
online/1633570002/ [https://perma.cc/JTM7-KL8A].
364. See Alyssa Rosenberg, Why I Thought Twice Before Saying #MeToo, WASH. POST
(Oct. 16, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2017/
10/16/metoo-of-course-but-what-comes-next/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/U7N6-
XBG4].
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It would be unfortunate if the aftermath of #MeToo moved the law 
to discourage workplace complaints of sexual harassment at a time 
when more employers are inclined to do something about them.368  
But that is not the only possible lesson from #MeToo that courts and 
lawyers might draw.369  Another possibility is that the #MeToo 
movement has shown how difficult it is to tell these stories in the 
moment and to stand up to abuses of power from a vulnerable 
position.370  The vast majority of high-profile #MeToo stories have 
come out long after the fact, when the women who suffered abuses 
are no longer in the vicinity of the abuser or his protectors.371  The 
strength of the movement and the importance of the communal nature 
of supportive responses demonstrates how difficult it is to tell these 
stories without the support of coworkers.372  The very name of the 
movement, MeToo, emphasizes the importance of validation by 
others.373  This lesson might support easing the stringency of the 
Burlington Northern standard,374 recognizing that coworker reactions 
are no less important than the reactions of supervisors in either 
narrowing or expanding the space to bring forward complaints of 
harassment.375 
Because the standard for measuring the severity of actionable 
retaliation is highly sensitive: to descriptive judgments about how 
people respond to retaliation and to prescriptive judgments about 
how resilient they should be in forging ahead with complaints;376 the 
shifts in the cultural norms governing the reception of such stories 
are likely to influence the development of the law in this area.377  It is 
too soon to say what the #MeToo movement will portend, but a 
368. See Sindhu Sundar, How #MeToo Is Changing Internal Investigations, LAW360 (Jan.
28, 2018, 9:17 PM), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2018/
01/how_metoo_is_changing_internal_investigations.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZMW2-
3D49].
369. See infra notes 370–75 and accompanying text.
370. See Jacey Fortin, #WhyIDidntReport: Survivors of Sexual Assault Share Their Stories
After Trump Tweet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/
23/us/why-i-didnt-report-assault-stories.html [https://perma.cc/UCH4-3CJB].
371. Id.
372. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 229, 252 & nn.148–50 (2018) (discussing the benefits of affirmative responses
from coworkers in sexual abuse disputes in the workplace).
373. See Wexler et al., supra note 1, at 71–72.
374. See supra notes 370–73 and accompanying text.
375. See Robinson et al., supra note 325, at 126–27.
376. See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 629–31 (arguing that coworker reactions to
harassment and to the reporting of harassment are largely determined by the
employer’s actions and managerial responses).
377. Id.
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recent decision from the Third Circuit looks to lead the way.378  In 
Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, the court opined that the #MeToo 
movement has underscored the difficulty of speaking up in the face 
of sexual harassment and abuse.379  The court’s discussion focuses on 
a different doctrine, the second prong of the affirmative defense to 
supervisory sexual harassment, which asks whether the plaintiff 
reasonably took advantage of the employer’s preventive and 
corrective measures for responding to sexual harassment.380  But the 
court’s analysis is equally pertinent to the question of whether a 
reasonable employee would persevere and complain anyway, even 
knowing that it would trigger the retaliatory acts at issue.381  The 
court’s acknowledgement of the difficulty, even under the best of 
circumstances, to report sexual harassment goes toward a more 
grounded application of the Burlington Northern standard to 
coworker retaliation.382 
C. Causation: Disentangling Mixed Motives and But-For Causes in
the Wake of Nassar and #MeToo
In 2013, the Supreme Court sent shock waves through retaliation 
law by deciding in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center 
v. Nassar that plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under Title VII
must prove that the retaliatory motive was the “but-for cause” of the
adverse action being challenged.383  Even though Title VII authorizes
employer liability for discrimination when the plaintiff’s protected
class is a motivating factor for an adverse employment decision,384
the Court in Nassar restricted that proof framework to claims for
status-based discrimination under § 703 of the statute.385  Henceforth,
the retaliation provision, § 704, which prohibits discrimination
“because of” the plaintiff’s protected conduct, would be governed by
the stricter but-for standard of causation.386
378. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2018).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. See id. at 311.
382. See id. at 314.
383. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).
384. See id. at 349.
385. See id. at 360.
386. See id. at 360–63.
 The text, structure, and history of Title VII demonstrate that a 
plaintiff making a retaliation claim under § 2000e-3(a) must 
establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of 
the alleged adverse action by the employer. The University claims 
42 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
That decision, which was criticized at the time for ignoring the 
mixed motive model of causation dating back to 1989 in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,387 sets retaliation law on a collision course 
with the real-world experience of discrimination and retaliation that 
has been revealed in the #MeToo movement.388  The requirement of 
but-for causation makes it harder to prove retaliation at a time when 
norms are beginning to encourage coming forward with experiences 
of sexual harassment, even while fatigue and backlash heighten the 
risk of punishing responses to such stories.389  The causation proof 
hurdle may increasingly challenge the ability of the law to adequately 
protect sexual harassment complainants.390 
Apart from raising the bar for the proof required to demonstrate 
causation,391 the but-for standard rests on assumptions about 
retaliatory motivations and their severability from discriminatory 
motivations, which are on shaky premises.392  A threshold question in 
approaching proof of causation, but one that is rarely, squarely 
addressed by courts, is what kind of frame of mind qualifies as a 
retaliatory motive.393  To win a retaliation claim even before Nassar, 
courts required plaintiffs to prove that the challenged conduct was 
motivated by retaliatory intent.394  Nassar did not create the need to 
that a fair application of this standard, which is more demanding 
than the motivating-factor standard adopted by the Court of 
Appeals, entitles it to judgment as a matter of law.   
Id. at 362–63. 
387. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989).
388. See supra notes 6–14 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 6–14, 385 and accompanying text; see also Understanding the Me
Too Movement: A Sexual Harassment Awareness Guide, MARYVILLE U.,
https://online.maryville.edu/blog/understanding-the-me-too-movement-a-sexual-
harassment-awareness-guide/ [https://perma.cc/SF2W-AZSY] (last visited Nov. 9,
2019).
390. See supra notes 383–86 and accompanying text; see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 383–85
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
391. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362–63 (stating that the but-for causation standard is “more
demanding” than the motivating-factor standard).
392. See id. at 342.
393. See infra notes 398–408 and accompanying text.
394. See, e.g., Perkins v. Harvey, 368 F. App’x 640, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding in
order to survive summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim, plaintiff must
“produce[] some evidence that the complained-of-actions were motivated by the
exercise of his protected right”; mere “uncivil or even abusive behavior” based on “a
personality conflict” will not suffice).  Although proximity alone may be enough to
support a question of fact on whether the plaintiff’s protected conduct caused the
retaliation, the time frame separating them must be very short in order to prove
causation without additional evidence.  See Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d
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define a retaliatory motive, but it does make the task of disentangling 
the retaliatory motive from other, non-retaliatory motivations more 
pressing.395  The retaliatory motive need not be the sole cause for 
what occurred, and another motive may co-exist alongside a 
retaliatory motive.396  But proving but-for causation when multiple 
motives are involved requires greater clarity about how to define a 
retaliatory motive and how to distinguish it from other motives.397  
The narrower the definition of retaliatory motive, the more difficult it 
becomes to isolate retaliation as the but-for cause of conduct that is 
traceable to multiple motivations.398  If retaliatory motive means 
animus above and beyond a “normal” desire to support a well-liked 
colleague, that could make proof of but-for causation difficult to 
establish in a retaliation claim.399 
This difficulty is present in all retaliation claims, but it is 
particularly thorny in coworker retaliation cases due to judges’ 
understanding of the complexity of coworker emotions and 
motivations when confronted with accusations of harassment leveled 
against a colleague.400  In coworker retaliation cases, courts are quick 
to view a coworker’s motivation to side with an accused harasser and 
protect him from repercussions as a legitimate motive.401 
The court in Noviello discussed such motivations by coworkers as 
legitimate and distinguished coworker retaliation from coworker 
harassment by explaining that in the case of the former, but not the 
latter, there is more likely to be a legitimate motivation behind the 
coworker’s offending conduct.402  This legitimate motivation, the 
court explained, could include taking the side of the person accused 
of harassment and siding against the complainant.403  Although the 
court was not discussing causation specifically, so much as 
articulating its understanding of differences in the underlying 
motivation in the two claims, the discussion holds important 
819, 828 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Even intervals shorter than four months are unlikely, 
standing alone, to establish the causation element of a retaliation claim.”). 
395. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.
396. See id. at 346–47 (stating that the requirement of but-for causation does not mean that
the retaliatory motive must be the sole cause, but rather that the retaliation would not
have occurred but for the protected activity).
397. See id. at 385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
398. See id.
399. See Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997).
400. See Porter, supra note 2, at 55.
401. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 93 (1st Cir. 2005).
402. See id. at 87.
403. Id. at 93.
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implications for proof of causation in a coworker retaliation claim—
especially after the Nassar decision.404  The court assumed that a 
retaliatory motive must rise to the level of animus above and beyond 
a mere desire to support and defend a person accused of 
harassment.405  Unlike status-based harassment, the Noviello court 
reasoned that there may be a defensible purpose underlying 
retaliatory harassment because “there is nothing inherently wrong . . . 
with supporting [an accused] friend or” wanting to stay out of the 
fray by avoiding the complainant.406  Such reasoning narrows what 
counts as a retaliatory motive.407  In many cases, it may be difficult to 
prove a motive to punish the accuser above and beyond a motive to 
side with the accused.408  To return to the earlier discussion of social 
closure,409 that work shows that closing ranks to show in-group 
favoritism is just as pernicious as animus toward the outgroup.410 
The difficulty of parsing an alleged retaliator’s desire to punish the 
complainant from a motive to support the accused employee may be 
difficult when the alleged retaliator is a coworker.411  With courts 
viewing coworker interactions through a lens that highlights the 
social nature of the dynamic rather than the professional,412 courts 
may be more likely to classify the motive as personal or social, 
seeing it as distinct from animus toward the protected conduct.413  
For example, the court in Sandberg v. Brennan, ruled that the 
plaintiff failed to prove causation in her retaliation claim in which: 
[A]nother worker [said] that Plaintiff was a ‘troublemaker’
in reference to her previous lawsuit.  Plaintiff allege[d] that
because of such statements, her coworkers avoided her,
gave her the cold shoulder, or were openly hostile to her . . .
[however, the court found the] statement to ‘be careful’ in
the Plaintiff’s presence, in and of itself, does not necessarily
404. Id. at 92.




409. See supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text.
410. See Albiston & Green, supra note 68, at 7.
411. See infra notes 412–16 and accompanying text.
412. See Rosenbury, supra note 287, at 121–23.
413. See id. at 125–26.
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indicate a desire to retaliate, but instead could demonstrate a 
desire to placate Plaintiff.414 
Although causation is a separate doctrinal hurdle from meeting the 
standard of severity in Burlington Northern,415 a similar tendency to 
separate the social from the professional in analyzing coworker 
retaliation may affect judicial approaches to both doctrines, with the 
effect of making it harder for plaintiffs to recover.416 
An additional burden on plaintiffs for proving causation in 
coworker retaliation cases, post-Nassar, is disentangling the 
retaliatory motives from any discriminatory motives in the 
coworker’s conduct.417  After Nassar, the presence of possible 
discriminatory motives complicates proof of causation on the 
retaliation claim, since the protected conduct, and not the protected 
class, must be found to be the but-for cause of the challenged 
retaliation.418  Prior to Nassar, under a mixed motive framework, 
both a retaliatory motive and a sex-based motive might co-exist 
without undermining liability for either sexual harassment or 
retaliation.419  Following Nassar, the plaintiff must now disentangle 
them, showing the retaliatory motive as the but-for cause, in order to 
prevail on a retaliation claim.420 
This sets a high bar regardless of whether the retaliator is a 
supervisor or a coworker.421  But in cases involving coworker 
retaliation, courts may be particularly likely to attribute 
discriminatory motives alongside retaliatory motives.422  This is 
because coworker retaliation typically involves harassment423—
coworkers not having the authority to take tangible employment 
414. Sandberg v. Brennan, No. 14-4033 (DWF/HB), 2017 WL 455931, at *4 (D. Minn.
Feb. 2, 2017).  The plaintiff was able to survive summary judgment on a separate
retaliation claim by challenging retaliatory acts occurring in a different time period in
response to protected conduct.  Id. at *5–6.
415. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
416. See sources cited supra note 289.
417. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360–63 (2013).
418. See id. at 359–60.
419. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (holding that “Title VII
meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate considerations”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, tit. I, §
107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)), as recognized in
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014).
420. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.
421. See id.
422. See Reaves, supra note 234, at 404–05.
423. See id.
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actions424—and retaliatory harassment can be difficult to distinguish 
from sexual harassment.425  As previously mentioned, following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Vance, more retaliation allegations than 
before will be classified as coworker retaliation,426 making it all the 
more important for retaliation plaintiffs to be able to parse the 
retaliatory and discriminatory motives of coworker actions.427 
Court decisions in coworker retaliation cases have assumed that 
retaliatory and discriminatory motives are distinct, requiring 
plaintiffs to prove that coworker retaliation was caused by a 
retaliatory motive and not merely by a discriminatory motive.428  In 
Noviello, for example, although the court allowed the sexually hostile 
environment and the post-complaint retaliatory harassment to be part 
of the same hostile environment for purposes of applying the 
continuing violation doctrine for tolling the statute of limitations, the 
court asserted that the “majority of cases are not cut from this 
seamless cloth,” and “[m]ost often” retaliation and sex discrimination 
motives are “distinct,” with the “intention to punish a person” for 
complaining being “a different animus than the sexual animus that 
drove the original harassment.”429  After scouring the record in that 
case, the court asserted that nothing in the record indicated “that the[] 
retaliatory acts were undertaken for reasons related to the plaintiff’s 
gender,” insisting instead that they were “two separate and 
independent harms.”430  The court’s understanding of the relationship 
between the sexual harassment and retaliation in Noviello enabled it 
to hold that an earlier sexually harassing act, which occurred outside 
the limitations period, could be folded into a timely retaliatory 
harassment claim.431  But the court’s discussion of the nature and 
relationship between retaliatory and discriminatory motives heralds 
difficulties for plaintiffs seeking to prove causation in a post-Nassar 
world.432 
Similarly, in Jensen v. Potter, the court emphasized that to prevail 
on a retaliation claim, the reason for the harassment must be 
retaliatory animus.433  In a passage suggesting a high burden on the 
424. See id.
425. See id.
426. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431–32 (2013).
427. See supra notes 417–26 and accompanying text.
428. See infra notes 429–35 and accompanying text.
429. Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2005).
430. Id.
431. See id. at 87–88.
432. See id. at 86–87.
433. See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449–50 (3d Cir. 2006).
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plaintiff to parse retaliatory motives from discriminatory ones, the 
court explained the following:  
[W]hen a woman who complains about sexual harassment is
thereafter subjected to harassment based on that complaint,
a claim that the harassment constitute[s] sex discrimination
(because a man who made such a complaint would not have
been subjected to similar harassment) will almost always
present a question that must be presented to the trier of
fact.434
Linking the harassment that follows the protected activity to a 
retaliatory motive may be particularly difficult, if the harassing 
coworkers contributed to the sexually harassing environment prior to 
the plaintiff’s original sexual harassment complaint.435 
While courts insist on parsing retaliatory motives from 
discriminatory ones, the cases themselves demonstrate how 
interrelated these motivations actually are.436  Sexism is often at the 
root of punishing women for complaining about sexual harassment, 
which represents a departure from gender norms that expect women 
to remain docile and put up with sexually harassing behaviors.437  
The facts of Noviello and Jensen show that retaliatory and 
discriminatory motives often coincide, and stand in stark contrast to 
those courts’ insistence on separating discriminatory from retaliatory 
motives.438  In Noviello, the court insisted that the retaliatory 
harassment and the gender-based motives were distinct,439 but the 
facts showed retaliation that was inseparable from the plaintiff’s 
status as a woman complaining of sexual harassment.440  For 
example, one of the retaliatory acts taken by coworkers involved a 
coworker falsely accusing the complainant of throwing a tampon at 
another coworker.441  And in Jensen, where the court’s discussion of 
retaliatory motivation also reflected its assumption that a retaliatory 
intent is distinct from a discriminatory one,442 the alleged retaliator 
434. Id. at 454.
435. See id.
436. See supra notes 428–35 and accompanying text.
437. See Reaves, supra note 234, at 408–10.
438. See Jensen, 435 F.3d at 446–47; see Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 82–83
(1st Cir. 2005).
439. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 87.
440. See id. at 82–83.
441. Id. at 93.
442. See Jensen, 435 F.3d at 454.
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called the plaintiff  “the [obscenity] who got [the harasser] in 
trouble.”443 
Fact patterns in cases where plaintiffs allege that coworker 
retaliation followed a complaint of sexual harassment often involve a 
combination of retaliatory and gender-specific post-complaint 
harassment.444  In one district court case alleging coworker 
retaliation, Juarez v. Utah, a coworker’s negative reactions to a 
female dental assistant who filed a sexual harassment complaint 
against the male dentist were both punishing and gendered—for 
example, telling the plaintiff, who was Latina, after she complained 
that she “was good only to do dishes at the office.”445  In  another 
case, Maldonado-Catala v. Municipality of Naranjito, the female 
plaintiff was called “machito” (which the court translated as 
“manly”) and subjected to sexually explicit, threatening, and vulgar 
epithets referencing her gender and sexual orientation after she 
complained of sexual harassment.446  In the latter case, the court 
denied summary judgment to the employer on both the sexual 
harassment claim and the retaliatory harassment claim, finding that 
the “same evidence” could support causation for both retaliatory 
animus and gender-based or sexual motivation,447 but the court 
reiterated that it was the plaintiff’s burden to prove that the post-
complaint harassment would not have occurred but for the retaliatory 
animus in order to prevail on the retaliation claim.448 
Ironically, the current state of the law may mean that the more 
terrible and overt the sexually discriminatory behavior, the more 
difficult it will be for plaintiffs to prove that the post-complaint 
harassment would not have occurred but for the retaliatory motive.449  
Instead, a court may view it as a continuation of the earlier sexual 
and gender-based motivation.450  On one hand, that makes it harder 
for plaintiffs to meet the causation standard necessary to prove 
retaliation.451  Alternatively, if the plaintiff is able to prove but-for 
causation for a retaliatory motive, the courts’ dichotomous view of 
443. Id. at 447.
444. See infra notes 445–48 and accompanying text.
445. Juarez v. Utah, 263 F. App’x 726, 732–33 (10th Cir. 2008).
446. Maldonado-Catala v. Municipality of Naranjito, 255 F. Supp. 3d 300, 307 (D.P.R.
2015), aff’d, 876 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).
447. Id. at 311.
448. See id. at 317–18.
449. See supra notes 395–399 and accompanying text.
450. See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 86 (1st Cir. 2005).
451. See Maldonado-Catala, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 320–21 (explaining that long periods of
delay between protected actions and termination can negate the inference of
retaliation).
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retaliatory and sex-based motivation, as either/or and not both, may 
mean that classifying the motive as retaliatory may hurt the plaintiff 
on a sexual harassment claim,452 especially if the court then fails to 
see continuation of harassment post-complaint as proof that the 
employer’s responsive action was unreasonable.453  The dichotomous 
parsing of retaliatory and discriminatory motives, whether it 
interferes with proof on the retaliation claim or the sexual harassment 
claim, poses a potential downside for the plaintiff either way.454 
III. RETALIATION LAW AND #METOO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND FOR THE
TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE MOVEMENT
The above discussion of how Title VII applies to coworker 
retaliation raises two related questions concerning the law’s 
intersection with the #MeToo movement.455  First, does the #MeToo 
movement contain lessons that might shape the development of 
retaliation law to better remedy the harms of retaliation by 
coworkers?456  Second, will the promise and limits of retaliation law 
affect the transformative potential of the movement?457  These 
questions are not limited to coworker retaliation, but in keeping with 
the focus of this article, the following discussion seeks to highlight 
the coworker angle, even as it discusses the movement’s relationship 
to retaliation law more broadly.458 
Social movements can have a dramatic impact on how courts 
understand and apply the law, even without legislative or regulatory 
change.459  One tangible indication that #MeToo may be having such 
an effect is the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Minarsky v. 
Susquehanna County, a case involving sexual harassment by a 
supervisor.460  Because the employer had a sexual harassment policy 
in place which the plaintiff failed to use to report the harassment, the 
district court granted summary judgment to the employer on the 
affirmative defense.461  The Third Circuit reversed, citing facts 
452. Cf. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 87–88.
453. See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 2006).
454. Cf. Noviello, 398 F.3d at 87–88.
455. See supra notes 359–61 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 362–67 and accompanying text.
457. See infra notes 480–506 and accompanying text.
458. See infra notes 459–506 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
460. Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2018).
461. Id.
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showing that the employer was on notice that the same supervisor 
had sexually harassed other women, and that the plaintiff testified 
that she was afraid to report him because her daughter had cancer and 
she relied on her job for medical coverage.462  In a remarkable 
footnote, the court expressly acknowledged lessons from the #MeToo 
movement, stating: 
 This appeal comes to us in the midst of national news 
regarding a veritable firestorm of allegations of rampant 
sexual misconduct that has been closeted for years, not 
reported by the victims. It has come to light, years later, that 
people in positions of power and celebrity have exploited 
their authority to make unwanted sexual advances. In many 
such instances, the harasser wielded control over the 
harassed individual’s employment or work environment. In 
nearly all of the instances, the victims asserted a plausible 
fear of serious adverse consequences had they spoken up at 
the time that the conduct occurred. While the policy 
underlying Faragher-Ellerth places the onus on the 
harassed employee to report her harasser, . . . there may be a 
certain fallacy that underlies the notion that reporting sexual 
misconduct will end it. Victims do not always view it in this 
way. Instead, they anticipate negative consequences or fear 
that the harassers will face no reprimand; thus, more often 
than not, victims choose not to report the harassment.463 
This alone is a stunning revelation of one court’s newfound 
skepticism of the assumption underpinning the Faragher-Ellerth 
framework, that the reasonable response to harassment is to report 
it.464  But the court went further to cite studies showing that non-
reporting is “pervasive,” noting both the prevalence of sexual 
harassment in the workplace and a finding from the EEOC task force 
that “three out of four women who have been harassed fail to report 
it” and instead would “avoid the harasser, deny or downplay the 
gravity of the situation, or attempt to ignore, forget, or endure the 
behavior.”465  Digging deeper, the court listed as reasons for 
462. Id. at 307, 314–16.
463. Id. at 313 n.12.
464. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998) (citing Faragher v.
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)) (discussing affirmative defenses to a 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) claim).
465. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12 (citing and quoting EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 3, at v).
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women’s non-reporting: “[B]ecause they fear[ed] disbelief of their 
claim, inaction on their claim, blame, or social or professional 
retaliation.”466 
Although the Minarsky case did not involve a retaliation claim, the 
court’s new-found sensitivity to employees’ fears of retaliation for 
speaking out about sexual harassment reveals that #MeToo has had a 
powerful effect on at least a few federal judges in their understanding 
of, and empathy for, women’s reluctance to report sexual 
harassment.467  The footnote’s window into judges’ thinking about 
the relationship between reporting sexual harassment and fears of 
retaliation suggests that #MeToo holds promise for influencing how 
courts apply retaliation law, including to coworker retaliation.468 
In fact, there are several ways that insights from #MeToo might 
further shape courts’ understanding of Title VII’s application to 
coworker harassment.469  Many of the stories of sexual abuse and 
harassment show the importance of informal power dynamics, and 
not just formal organizational power, in silencing women and 
keeping them vulnerable to continued abuse.470  Coworkers as well as 
higher-ups contribute to a culture of silence.471  This observation has 
implications for the standard of liability courts apply to coworker 
retaliation, insofar as it rejects formally delegated power as the 
exclusive means of employer control,472 and for the standard for 
retaliatory action under Burlington Northern, insofar as it evidences 
the chilling effect of coworker responses to complaining.473  Among 
the court’s reflections on retaliation in Minarsky, the court included 
citations to sources making the point that women are deterred from 
reporting sexual harassment by fears of social as well as professional 
reactions.474  This observation suggests that courts may be receptive 
466. Id.
467. Id. at 313–17 (discussing the reasonableness of plaintiff’s failure to report
harassment).
468. Id. at 313–14 n.12.
469. See supra notes 60–64, 76–82 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.
471. See supra notes 44–45, 73–75 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 137–47 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 292–99 and accompanying text.
474. Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 313 n.12 (3d Cir. 2018) (first citing
EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at v; then citing Stefanie Johnson et al.,
Why We Fail to Report Sexual Harassment, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/10/why-we-fail-to-report-sexual-harassment
[https://perma.cc/G576-U7LK]; and then citing ABC News/Wash. Post, Unwanted
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to appreciating the blurriness of the boundary between the social and 
professional realms.475 
Another take-away from the #MeToo movement is that the stories 
reveal sexual harassment and abuse occurring simultaneously with 
silencing and threats to punish reporting.476  This insight has 
implications for both the liability standard for coworker retaliation, 
supporting using the same standard for coworker retaliation as for 
coworker sexual harassment,477 and for the causation analysis, 
because it exposes the falsity of a dichotomous view of retaliatory 
and sex/gender-based motivation for post-complaint harassment.478 
But there may be limits to how far #MeToo insights can take 
retaliation law.479  As #MeToo fatigue sets in, courts may be wary 
about pressing employers to go too far in policing complicated 
coworker dynamics in reaction to sexual harassment complaints.480  
Although calibrating a reasonable employer response to known 
coworker retaliation should not necessarily be more difficult than 
determining employer reasonableness in responding to coworker 
sexual harassment, courts may tread lightly into what they view as 
the social realm of coworker reactions in the workplace.481  This may 
not be an entirely bad thing for the impact of the movement.  If 
courts pressed too far by censoring expressions of support for the 
accused, backlash may ensue, thereby solidifying resistance to 
#MeToo rather than changing the norms of sexual abuses of 
power.482  In calibrating the determination of employer 
reasonableness, retaliation law must leave enough space for civil 
discourse surrounding #MeToo moments without allowing coworkers 
to punish and deter such allegations.483 




476. See Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1329–30 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Parra v. White
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There is also ambiguity in how #MeToo will affect the standard 
under Burlington Northern.484  One possible interpretation of where 
#MeToo has taken mainstream culture is that a normative shift has 
occurred, incentivizing the disclosures of sexual harassment so that it 
would take more now to deter the telling of these stories than before 
#MeToo.485  It would be unfortunate if the very success of #MeToo 
in breaking down the silence surrounding sexual harassment and 
abuse resulted in heightening the legal standard for determining what 
retaliatory actions are likely to deter a reasonable woman from 
speaking up about sexual harassment.  A better interpretation, and 
one more consistent with the tenor of the movement and with the 
purpose of retaliation law to open up the channels of complaint, 
would highlight the takeaway from the #MeToo narrative of how 
difficult it is to break the code of silence and reveal a sexually 
harassing incident.486  Many of the #MeToo stories are disclosures 
from long ago, revealed well after the woman left the site of the 
harassment.487  The avalanche of pent-up stories shows how difficult 
it is to speak out in the moment, when action might (at least in 
theory) be taken to correct the harassment.488  Despite the impact of 
#MeToo, employees who are sexually harassed remain vulnerable to 
retribution by coworkers and supervisors to punish and chill 
complaints.489 
Whatever effect #MeToo has on the law of retaliation, a related 
question is what impact retaliation law will have on the trajectory of 
the movement.490  Fear of retaliation has long been the primary force 
deterring victims of sexual harassment from speaking out.491  Will 
the limited effectiveness of Title VII law constrain how far the 
movement can go in promoting disclosures of sexual harassment at 
work? 
Even if #MeToo pushes retaliation doctrine to be more 
encompassing of coworker retaliation, there are limits to how 
effectively the law can clear the channels of communicating sexual 
484. See supra Section II.B.
485. See Deepti Hajela & Juliet Linderman, 1 Year After MeToo, Survivors Reflect on
Their Disclosures, AP NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/5ea53cb201ca
415292f5d42b19e9abec [https://perma.cc/48SE-3UDQ].
486. See Chira & Einhorn, supra note 71.
487. See Hajela & Linderman, supra note 485.
488. See id.
489. See Jodka, supra note 480.
490. Id.
491. Chira & Einhorn, supra note 71.
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misconduct in the workplace.492  Retaliation law was designed to 
protect official channels of complaining either through the legal 
system or the employer’s internal reporting channels.493  To the 
extent disclosures are made outside the workplace and on social 
media, it will be more difficult to prove employer knowledge, which 
is a prerequisite to proving that protected activity was the cause of 
retaliatory actions.494  Furthermore, it is by no means clear that social 
media disclosures would count as protected activity at all, which 
Title VII requires to be reasonable in form and proportionate to the 
harassment.495  Tweeting about sexual harassment instead of telling a 
manager will likely not meet this standard and not rise to the level of 
protected conduct.496 
The main import of retaliation law in relation to #MeToo, however, 
is in protecting disclosures of sexual harassment—disclosures that 
may be inspired by the attention that #MeToo has focused on sexual 
harassment—that are made through the proper legal or employer-
created channels for reporting.497  Here too retaliation law can only 
promise so much.498  There has long been a tension between 
retaliation law’s (and employers’) promise of protection from 
retaliation and the reality of employer discretion in overseeing the 
implementation of internal anti-harassment policies.499  The 
reasonableness of an employer’s response will inevitably be 
measured with a good dose of judicial appreciation for an employer’s 
discretionary judgment about how to manage the workplace.500 
There is also the risk that #MeToo may be changing the norms of 
appropriate sexual conduct too quickly for the law to keep up.501  
Retaliation law protects internal opposition to sexual harassment only 
if it is predicated on an objectively reasonable belief that the 
underlying conduct was in fact unlawful.502  Some of the #MeToo 
stories are pushing the boundaries of cultural understanding of sexual 
492. See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
493. See Jodka, supra note 480.
494. See id.
495. See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449–50 (3d Cir. 2006).
496. See id.
497. See supra Section II.A.
498. See supra Section II.A.
499. See Chira & Einhorn, supra note 71 (discussing this tension within Ford plants).
500. See supra Section II.A.
501. See supra Section II.C.
502. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining that in order to be
actionable, conduct must be such that it creates an “environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive”).
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harms far beyond what the law recognizes as actionable.503  The Aziz 
Ansari story—although not a story of workplace misconduct—and 
the ensuing controversy surrounding it, serves as a reminder of how a 
#MeToo narrative can articulate an experience of sexual harm that 
goes well beyond the contours of what the law captures.504  To the 
extent that a more expansive understanding of sexual harm is 
emerging from #MeToo, the reasonable belief doctrine might leave 
more internal complaints about sexual harm in the workplace 
unprotected from retaliation than before.505 
In the final analysis, the continuing strength of #MeToo will 
depend more on the changing norms of support for telling these 
stories than from the scope of legal protection from retaliation.  
Perhaps the most we can expect from Title VII when it comes to 
coworker retaliation is to set outer limits that pressure employers not 
to let negative coworker reactions get too far out of hand.506 
IV. CONCLUSION
At bottom, one of the biggest explanatory forces behind #MeToo is
the failure of law, not just of sexual harassment law, but of retaliation 
law.507  The manifest reluctance to express opposition to sexual 
harassment in a timely fashion through workplace channels speaks 
volumes about the limits of law in offering meaningful protection 
from retaliation at work.508  The bubbling over of #MeToo stories on 
social media, an extralegal channel is, in a very real sense, strong 
evidence not just of the failure of the substantive law of sexual 
harassment, but also of retaliation law’s failure to reassure people 
that they are safe to expose such conduct through official legal and 
workplace channels.509  In terms of the relationship between law and 
social movements, that is both a pessimistic indicator of the limits of 
law to fuel social change, and also an optimistic sign that real-world 
limits on the ability to reshape law may not, in the end, cause too 
503. See Way, supra note 12.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. See EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 43 (discussing steps employers
should take in order to prevent negative coworker reactions and retaliation from
getting out of hand).
507. See Porter, supra note 2, at 49–50 (discussing the rise of the #MeToo movement and
the failure of retaliation law).
508. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 313 n.12 (3d Cir. 2018).
509. See Vedantam, supra note 61 (discussing Facebook, Twitter, and Google as powerful
tools to connect victims and reassure people they are safe to expose offensive
conduct).
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great a hindrance to the deepening of the movement.510  Seen in that 
light, the difficulty retaliation law has encountered in policing 
coworker retaliation in particular may not spell doom for the 
continuation of the #MeToo narratives after all.511 
Retaliation law can only do so much to shield complainants from 
the daggers and darts of coworker hostility.512  Nevertheless, it can 
and should do better at setting outer boundaries to police coworker 
retaliatory targeting at work.513  Better tailoring of retaliation law to 
recognize the harms of coworker retaliation may help nudge 
workplace norms, and by extension social norms, away from 
punishing responses and toward constructive dialogue; thereby 
discouraging efforts to shut down disclosures of sexual 
harassment.514 
The ultimate issue underlying the question of how retaliation law 
should respond to the #MeToo movement is how much the law 
should protect these stories.515  Any judgment about the 
reasonableness of an employer’s response to retaliatory responses to 
sexual harassment allegations,516 the severity of retaliatory 
harassment required to violate Title VII,517 and the stringency 
required for proof of causation,518 must be informed by the value of 
bringing such allegations to light.  At the end of the day, these 
doctrinal choices depend on how much space we think the law should 
protect for calling out sexual harassment at work.  Recently, New 
York Times columnist David Brooks cautioned that “call out 
culture”—an implicit reference to #MeToo—represents a feudal 
vigilante justice that weakens communal social ties and drains the 
empathy and nuance necessary for a healthy society.519  This 
510. See Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12.
511. Id.
512. See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 639–40 (“Employment law prohibits retaliation
for taking action against legal violations, but it does so too narrowly to insulate
coworker support from employer discipline, leaving employers free to retaliate
against coworkers who exchange support in many circumstances.”).
513. See Albiston & Green, supra note 68, at 34–35.
514. See Porter, supra note 2, at 61 (discussing how the #MeToo movement and an
overhaul of retaliation law would ideally “lead to all workers being more sensitive to
harassment, which would ideally lead to less workplace harassment”).
515. See Green, supra note 42, at 152.
516. See supra Section II.A.
517. See supra Section II.B.
518. See supra Section II.C.
519. David Brooks, The Cruelty of Call-Out Culture: How Not to Do Social Change, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/opinion/call-out-social-
justice.html [https://perma.cc/4FZD-JM9R].
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perspective should not be too quickly dismissed: Brooks articulates 
real risks that black and white stories of villains and victims 
oversimplify and polarize, where empathy and understanding are 
needed for lasting normative change.520  But Brooks’s account 
understates the value of #MeToo-inspired complaints of sexual 
harassment at work.521  The deluge of #MeToo stories represents the 
failure of law and civil discourse at work, and the turn to social 
media for telling these stories indicates the failure of other channels 
to provide support and justice.522  In order to have more due process 
in the course of deciphering contested allegations, and more civility 
in the discourse around them, we need more—not less—space for 
telling accounts of sexual harassment in settings where accountability 
and redress are possible.523 
The critique of #MeToo “call out” culture also misses something 
important about the value of narratives of sexual harm.524  The power 
of the narratives lends believability and credibility to the stories of 
women and sexual harm, which have long been vulnerable to 
discrediting tactics.525  It has always been easy to dismiss the lone 
woman who comes forward to accuse a powerful man of sexual 
harassment.526  This skepticism affects girls and women of any age 
and in virtually any setting where sexual misconduct is 
encountered.527  In the foundational case recognizing peer sexual 
harassment as a violation of Title IX, for example, the principal 
responded to the 5th grade girl’s repeated complainants of sexual 
harassment from a 5th grade boy by asking, doubtfully, why she was 
the only one complaining.528  The me too part of #MeToo has been 
critical for bolstering the believability of girls and women coming 
forward with stories of sexual harm.529  That need not, as Brooks 
fears, force absolutist claims to believe all women.530  Nor need 
#MeToo devolve into false equivalencies of a wide range of sexual 
520. Id.
521. Id.; see also supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 509-11 and accompanying text.
523. See supra notes 354-58 and accompanying text.
524. See supra notes 484-88 and accompanying text.
525. Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 313 n.12 (3d Cir. 2018).
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(1999).
528. Id. at 635.
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harms nor dehumanize all purveyors of sexual harm.531  Feminists, 
and the culture at large, have the capacity for nuanced moral 
judgment and tolerance for ambiguity when the truth is elusive.532 
Perhaps most importantly, the critique of #MeToo as vigilante 
justice fails to account for the healing power of the stories themselves 
for the survivors who tell them.533  We should remember that the 
originator of #MeToo, Tarana Burke, founded the movement, 
focusing on black girls and women, for its collective therapeutic 
power to heal the scars of long-suppressed sexual abuse.534  Calls for 
repercussions for the perpetrators of abuse came much later, and are 
not the only value of #MeToo disclosures.535 
The deeply personal narratives of #MeToo have forced people far 
and wide to take notice of, and try to understand and empathize with, 
survivors of sexual harassment and abuse.536  They have deepened 
our cultural understanding of the injuries of sexual misconduct, with 
the potential to generate social change to make these harms less 
common, particularly for younger generations.537  Retaliation law 
may not be able to fully protect future sexual harassment claimants 
who are inspired by #MeToo to tell their stories, but insights from the 
movement have the potential to make the law at least a moderately 
better fit.538  Particularly when it comes to retaliation by coworkers, 
long the stepchild of retaliation law, Title VII has room to grow, and 
lessons from #MeToo can help light the way.539 
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